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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the scope and current restrictions of the reverse 
solicitation regime vis-à-vis European financial services law. Given the reliance on 
ambiguous terminology, ill-defined concepts and inconsistencies throughout MiFID II, the 
analysis throughout the work concludes that the concept of reverse solicitation in its current 
form cannot be reliably utilised by third-country financial service providers due to numerous 
inadvertent non-compliance risks. The study concludes that the current reverse solicitation 
regime needs to be heavily revised to allow for a sufficient degree of legal certainty. 
Consequently, the thesis also puts forth a number of much-needed improvements in terms of 
the concept of reverse solicitation in efforts to provide for a solution to the plethora of 
shortcomings currently haunting MiFID II. 
 
  
SUMMARY 
The scope of the research deals with the notion of reverse solicitation stemming from one of 
the cornerstone legal instruments vis-à-vis European financial services law, i.e., MiFID II. A 
review is thus undertaken to deduce whether the concepts used in setting up the reverse 
solicitation regime are defined to a sufficiently concise degree to mitigate issues pertaining to 
legal certainty and limit regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the work attempts address whether 
the concept in its current form provides for far too many restrictions in relation to entities 
seeking to utilise the reverse solicitation regime on a permanent basis. 
Given that failure to comply with the rigid scope of the notion of reverse solicitation could be 
particularly devastating to entities operating in the highly-regulated realm of financial markets 
and services, entities must ensure compliance to avoid regulatory sanctions. However, 
MiFID II is plagued by a great deal of issues due to its failure to define some of the most 
pertinent aspects to be taken into account by non-EU financial service and product providers 
when engaging with European retail and professional clients.  
Consequently, the scope of the reverse solicitation regime is placed under closer scrutiny. 
This refers to, inter alia, the limitation of the reverse solicitation regime exclusively in 
relation to third-country entities, with undertakings established within the Union, and thus 
licenced pursuant to EU law are excluded from the scope of the reverse solicitation 
framework. Subsequently, the author performs a review of service recipient categorisation 
rules. Despite appearing to be of no importance at a first glance, it soon becomes clear that 
MiFID II must undergo significant changes. Consequently, analysis in respect of client 
categorisation benefits the former part of the thesis, whereby a number of proposals for the 
revision of MiFID II are set forth. 
Moreover, further inconsistencies are pointed out in relation to the provision of additional 
services on the basis of reverse solicitation. Also in this regard in-depth analysis must be 
undertaken in efforts to address a seemingly trivial issue. However, as has been determined by 
the author's analysis pertaining to the exact scope of the reverse solicitation regime, the notion 
of "new categories" is of equal importance. Notwithstanding the failure among legal scholars 
to reach a consensus on the proper interpretation of the marketing restrictions stemming from 
MiFID II, coupled with discrepancies within the text of the Directive itself, the author thus 
attempts to develop a coherent approach in determining the exact scope of the marketing 
regime. Where third-country entities already face a stringent regulatory framework, even the 
tiniest of carve-outs granted to these undertaking must be celebrated. Nonetheless, the 
analysis conducted in relation thereto might not necessarily have provided for a concrete 
answer, yet again illustrating the weak degree of legal certainty at the disposal of entities 
incorporated outside the border of the Union. 
Subsequently, the analysis is followed by considerations in relation to the main principles of 
the regime. For one, reverse solicitation requires that clients approach service providers on 
their "own exclusive initiative". This phrase in and of itself is distinctly vague, and provides 
for a number of implied restrictions in terms of marketing activities that non-EU service 
providers may perform when relying on the reverse solicitation framework. 
The ongoing confusion in terms of how liberally the marketing regime may be interpreted 
starkly emphasises the weak points of the MiFID II regime, as non-EU investment firms 
seeking access to European markets and clients appear to be facing a worrying number of 
undertakings of one and the same concept. Under these circumstances third-country financial 
service providers appear to be stripped of even the most basic levels of legal certainty, thus 
dealing a strong blow to entities that would otherwise seek access to the lucrative European 
financial market. 
Given that reverse solicitation is not necessarily a unique concept stemming from only 
MiFID II, the AIFMD too is assessed to allow one to more precisely establish the particular 
boundaries of the marketing regime. In assessing the AIFMD regime, however, one is faced 
with the same widespread use of ambiguous terms. In fact, whereas reverse solicitation is 
expressly provided for under MiFID II, AIFMD lacks even such elementary provision.  
Subsequently, by taking into account results derived from in-depth analyses of concept 
relevant for the MiFID II reverse solicitation regime, the thesis is concluded by setting forth 
areas of the MIFID II framework in need of urgent revision. By incorporation both problem 
areas highlighted by ESMA, and taking into account additional shortcomings that have 
emerged as a result of the examination of various MiFID II and AIFMD concepts, the author 
thus proposes a comprehensive set of changes to be addressed by the successor of MIFID II. It 
is thus also submitted that failure to bring about the respective changes will likely bar third-
country firms from enjoying at least a basic level of legal certainty in rendering services on 
the basis of reverse solicitation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The realm of financial services is a particularly complex one, and not without proper reason. 
Not only are these services and products more often than not incomprehensible to the general 
public, they require at least a degree of specific knowledge to produce a return on investment. 
Thus, the underlying regulatory framework may well prove to be one's worst nightmare. 
Nonetheless, the thick layer of requirements, restrictions, thresholds, and rules are in fact 
much needed. The 2008 financial crisis, having just recently celebrated its tenth anniversary, 
proved to be a crucial turning point for lawmakers in the European Union (hereinafter: EU or 
Union) and elsewhere. 
The 2008 meltdown highlighted the urgent need for a tide of major reforms for financial 
markets.
1
 There is little disagreement within academic and professional circles in relation to 
claims that the comparatively loose regulatory framework was one of the main drivers behind 
the crisis by allowing the virtually turbulent markets and their participants to flourish at the 
expense of investors.
2
 Coupled with the interconnectedness of European markets with those 
abroad located in jurisdictions allowing for a more relaxed approach towards financial 
regulations,
3
 the numerous European regulatory measures aimed at reducing the outfall of the 
crisis evidently failed to do their part.
4
 Thus, understandably, lawmakers at the EU level were 
finally under the pressure to step up their game and produce a new set of rules and guidelines 
to be abided by providers of financial services and products. 
This development, inter alia, resulted in non-EU financial firms being brought under the 
scope of Union legislation within the realm of financial regulations. Consequently, via the 
introduction of first-generation financial law directives in the EU, third-country service 
providers were made subject to EU law when interacting with Union-based legal or natural 
persons. Moreover, European legislation imposing certain restrictions in relation to non-EU 
service providers became applicable.
5
 As a result thereof, Directive 2014/65/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments 
(hereinafter: MiFID II) was introduced, and nationals laws transposing it by and large became 
applicable on 3 January 2017, with a few exceptions pertaining to EU member states' 
transitional provisions pushing the application date further down the road.  
With the introduction of MiFID II and other directives,
6
 the current European regulatory 
framework vis-à-vis financial services and products attempts to further harmonise the intra-
                                                 
1
 European Securities and Markets Authority. Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities, p.47. Available on: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-
report_on_trends_risks_and_vulnerabilities_no1_2019.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2019. 
2
 Bentley J. Anderson, "An Overview of the AIFMD for US Investment Manager," Business Law International 
17 (2016): p.42. 
3
 Niamh Moloney, Jennifer Payne and Eilís Feran, The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.786-787. 
4
 Aleksandra Visekruna, "The Access to the EU Financial Market for the Companies from Non-Member States," 
EU and Comparative Law Issues and Challenges Series 2 656(2018): p.657. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 See also Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment 
in transferable securities, Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 
on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
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EU financial markets by setting forth a number of Union-wide restrictions and requirements, 
be it in terms of investor protection, capital standards or licencing prerequisites. It is thus 
generally the case that only qualified undertakings whose management personnel conforms to 
strict educational and professional standards are entitled to provide financial services to 
recipients within the European Union. As outlined above, in the absence of such progress, 
European financial markets would remain exposed to numerous vulnerabilities and entities 
operating therein would continue to face uncertainty during upcoming times of instability 
within the markets. 
The current MiFID II directive replaced its predecessor, the Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments 
(hereinafter: MiFID I), and brought about a number of crucial amendments, including the 
focal point of this thesis, i.e., the notion of reverse solicitation. The importance of MiFID II in 
terms of the realm of European financial services law must be specifically stressed, as third-
country undertakings' access to the internal EU market was not dealt with under MiFID I,
7
 
resulting in an patchwork of various legal requirements and restrictions depending on the 
member state in question with a low degree of harmonisation.
8
 
As per Article 42 of MiFID II, third-country financial service providers are entitled to render 
financial services to clients based within the EU without first having to obtain a licence or any 
other form of authorisation from European regulatory authorities, provided the respective 
clients solicited the services on their "own exclusive initiative".
9
 This recent development is 
also often referred to as "reverse solicitation", as it calls for the service recipients to make the 
first step and initiate the respective transaction, instead of relying on more traditional models 
generally utilised across the financial services sector. This phrase will be used 
interchangeably throughout the thesis with references to Article 42 of MiFID II. 
The scope of Article 42 is not limited to a particular category of service recipients, therefore 
resulting in non-EU firms catering towards either professional or retail clients being subject to 
one and the same conditions. Nonetheless, the scope of Article 42 is limited to the exact 
client-firm relationship within the confines of which the service or product was requested by 
the client.
10
 Additionally, a further limitation is imposed in terms of advertising activities, 
however, as argued under the following chapters, the aforesaid notion of "own exclusive 
initiative" provides for an implied ban on promotional activities on the part of the service 
provider. 
Considering the ambiguous use of language under Article 42 of MiFID II, and having regard 
to the heavy restrictions imposed upon third-country financial service providers, Article 42 
provides for a plethora of non-compliance risks, simultaneously imposing numerous 
                                                                                                                                                        
trading, Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, Directive 
2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market 
abuse, et. al. 
7
 Visekruna, supra note 4, p.667. 
8
  Dr. Wolfgang Weitnauer, Lutz Boxberger and Dr. Dietmar Anders, Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch, 
Investmentsteuergesetz, EuVECA-VO, EuSEF-VO und ELTIF-VO [Capital Investment Code, Regulation on 
European venture capital funds, Regulation on European social entrepreneurship funds and Regulation on 
European long-term investment funds] (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck oHG, 2017), p.453. 
9
 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014. Article 42. Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0065. Accessed 20 May 2019. 
10
 Ibid. 
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requirements for non-Union firms. Therefore, the following thesis shall attempt to answer the 
research question of whether Article 42 of MiFID II, on the one hand, is too restrictive 
whereas its wording, on the other hand, is too ambiguous, resulting in a high risk of 
unintentional breach of its scope. Moreover, the thesis shall outline areas of particular concern 
that have to be addressed by the successor of MiFID II, and put forth a number of proposals in 
relation to a revised reverse solicitation regime. 
First and foremost, the scope of the reverse solicitation exemption shall be examined, 
highlighting the heavy restrictions imposed by MiFID II. As indicated previously, Article 42 
incorporates major limitations pertaining to groups of potential clients to whom financial 
services may be rendered on the basis of reverse solicitation. Whereas investor protection 
concerns are well justified when dealing with mere retail clients, imposing equally severe 
restrictions for professional clients, however, remains questionable and appears to run 
contrary to established principles of international financial law. Moreover, given the limited 
sphere of potential service recipients, the legal basis for setting up such stringent restrictions 
and creating a seemingly unfavourable environment for third-country service providers shall 
also be examined. 
Second, the requirement for clients soliciting the respective services to have approached the 
service provider on their "own exclusive initiative" will also be addressed. The phrase "own 
exclusive initiative" in and of itself provides for a great deal of implied restrictions in terms of 
marketing activities undertaken by the respective service provider, as solicitation, promotion 
or advertisement of the respective service to the particular client will void one’s ability to rely 
on Article 42 when interacting with European clients. Ensuring compliance with this concept 
in terms of record-keeping, as highlighted in this work, is particularly complex, and differs 
from member state to member state, thus only adding to the long list of issues pertaining to 
the reverse solicitation regime. 
Furthermore, the term "marketing" may well be interpreted in the widest possible sense, 
resulting in third-country firms potentially being barred from ever rendering services once 
marketed in the relevant territory. This remains the case even in relation to professional 
clients with sufficient levels of capital to weather times of economic hardship arising out of 
poor investment choices or meagre performance. Additionally, a concerning degree of 
uncertainty as to the classification of activities falling short of marketing remains neglected 
under MiFID II. Whereas this uncertainty at times could be of use for third-country service 
providers, it still possesses unattractive risks, especially when considering sanctions for 
failure to comply with the respective licencing regimes. 
In relation to the notions of both marketing and reverse solicitation itself, the thesis shall 
utilize commentaries covering Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (hereinafter: AIFMD), as 
the AIFMD too provides for the possibility to rely on reverse solicitation. Nonetheless, 
reverse solicitation under MiFID II and AIFMD can be compared only to a certain degree due 
to opposite approaches incorporated under either directive. This divergence will be explained 
under the respective chapter. 
Marketing restrictions under MiFID II further provide for the need to ascertain the particular 
types of investment services and instruments being rendered, distinguishing between complex 
and non-complex products, as well as to evaluate the risk level inherent to each product 
4 
 
category.
11
 The thesis shall consequently argue that only by performing such additional 
analysis can third-country entities ensure that any such marketing activities do not relate to 
"new categories" of services or instruments rendered, as otherwise non-EU firms would once 
again risk breaching Union law. Moreover, the above considerations will subsequently be 
analysed taking into account existing contractual relations between third-country service 
providers and EU nationals, a framework wherein third-country service providers might well 
have to exercise immense caution in efforts not to infringe upon restrictions laid down by 
Article 42 of MiFID II due to limitations in terms of the "relationship specifically relating to 
the provision of that service or activity"
12
. 
Consequently, the thesis will explore each of the distinct concepts of "own exclusive 
initiative", "marketing", "pre-marketing" and "new categories" individually in efforts to 
establish a more concrete scope applicable to reverse solicitation under Article 42 of MiFID 
II. 
Should these requirements be complied with, third-country financial service providers need 
not seek authorization from national or European-level authorities in relation to that specific 
service or activity. However, the European Securities and Markets Authority (hereinafter: 
ESMA) has itself expressed concerns pertaining to the suitability of reverse solicitation within 
the overall EU legal framework on the grounds of investor protection and legal certainty. 
More alarming, however, remain its calls for a revision of Article 42 MiFID II. Taking into 
account analyses stemming from subsequent sections of the thesis, the work will thereafter 
attempt to evaluate the legitimacy of the ESMA's concerns and attempt to answer whether a 
proposed solution thereof is appropriate, if at all needed. 
Having considered the above issues, the thesis shall be concluded by an analysis of the 
research question stated above, incorporating, inter alia, a review of the possibility for third-
country investment firms to reliably utilise reverse solicitation on a long-term basis when 
dealing with intra-EU clients from compliance and risk management perspectives. In this 
regard, the risk of inadvertent breach of compliance obligations, as well as the long-list of 
limitations shall play a critical role. 
  
                                                 
11
 European Securities and Markets Authority. Questions and Answers on MiFID II and MiFIR Investor 
Protection and Intermediaries Topics: 28 March 2019, p.104. Available on: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/23414/download?token=dySuQzDC. Accessed 20 April 2019. 
12
 Supra note 9. 
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 THIRD-COUNTRY SERVICE PROVIDERS' ACCESS TO EU MARKETS 1.
Against the backdrop of the pre-crisis financial services market, wherein a number of entities 
were not regulated at the EU level,
13
 the shortcomings of MiFID I become rather apparent. 
Having experienced the 2008 financial instability, the need to bring as many financial service 
providers within the scope of upcoming European legislative revisions was of high 
importance. Therefore, the origins of reverse solicitation are also found during these tumulus 
times, with third-country service providers finally being brought under the scope of MiFID II. 
Whilst one might intrinsically presume that the European financial services market is only 
open for entities incorporated within the borders of the EU, the current regulatory framework 
provides for certain access rights of third-country firms, with issues pertaining to the legal 
basis thereof having been resolved by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: 
CJEU). Freedom of capital movement, for one, is not limited to movement within the border 
of the EU only, instead also covering capital flows into the common market from foreign 
jurisdictions.
14
 Nonetheless, as per case law of the CJEU, third-country entities may not rely 
on the freedom of capital movement when rendering services within the Union.
15
 Whereas 
clients' capital and other assets will certainly exchange hands at some point during the 
particular transaction, provisions pertaining to the freedom of services under the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU) are to be applied instead. Thus, as the 
scope of the respective freedom may not be extended to cover also non-EU undertakings,
16
 
the legal basis for such companies' activities within the Union are to be found elsewhere, 
leading to the application of MiFID I and MiFID II. 
Non-EU entities are defined as undertakings that are not registered and licenced in either one 
EU member state, but, importantly, would amount to an entity subject to MiFID II or some 
other European financial law, had its country of incorporation been located within the borders 
of the Union.
17
 Furthermore, MiFID II covers entities which provide financial services and 
products on a professional business basis.
18
 Whereas the Directive does not differentiate 
between the legal types of the service provider, i.e. limited liability or public undertakings,
19
 
the provision of financial services and products "on a professional basis"
20
 is of essence. 
Thus, the treatment of non-EU undertakings as provided for under MiFID II currently 
foresees, for example, the establishment of branches or full-fledged subsidiaries within the 
EU, or permits the reliance on the concept of reverse solicitation. 
MiFID I did not permit the reverse solicitation regime, instead requiring that third-country 
investment service providers establish branches within the borders of the EU. Reverse 
solicitation, however, does not foresee such requirement to create a physical presence in the 
EU, instead permitting EU clients to approach the respective undertaking in their third-
                                                 
13
 Moloney, supra note 3, p.5. 
14
 Visekruna, supra note 4, p.659. 
15
 Peter Derleder, Kai-Oliver Knops and Heinz Georg Bamberger, Deutsches und europäisches Bank- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht [German and European Banking and Capital Markets Law] (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2017), p.1927. 
16
 Judgment in Fidium Finanz, C-452/04, EU:C:2006:631, para.25. 
17
 Danny Busch and Marije Louisse, "MiFID II/MiFIR's Regime for Third-Country Firms," in Regulation of the 
EU Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR, ed. Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), para.10.04. 
18
 Supra note 9, Recital 12. 
19
 Moloney, supra note 3, p.341. 
20
 Supra note 9, Recital 12. 
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country of incorporation or elsewhere outside the EU. Such uneven treatment of non-EU 
firms naturally resulted in financial service providers seeking access to particular member 
states whose national laws permitted access to third-country entities, meanwhile abstaining 
from entering certain national markets due to a combination of overly cautious legislators and 
strong national financial service providers’ lobby.21 Under circumstances of artificially 
limited cross-border competition with non-EU entities, service recipients suffer the most. As 
national undertakings enjoy protection from potential competitors, the need for entities to 
provide innovative financial services and products is intentionally suppressed, since the 
recipients of such services are unable to attain what they seek due to the potential service 
providers being unable to enter the local European market. Fortunately, MiFID II recognises 
the need for third-country entity participation within the EU financial services market. The 
suitability and appropriateness of the European approach towards non-EU firms under MiFID 
II, however, will be analysed in greater detail within this and subsequent chapters. 
At the same time, however, CJEU has been rather definite in, on the one hand, acknowledging 
that European measures aimed at restricting or otherwise hindering third-country service 
providers' access to European markets comes at a detriment to clients residing in EU member 
states.
22
 On the other hand, however, it has stipulated "that is merely an unavoidable 
consequence of the restriction on the freedom to provide services"
23
, thus indicating that the 
complete abolition of any hurdles to non-EU entities might not necessarily be required. 
Along with other options available to non-EU service providers, Article 39 of MiFID II 
provides for the right of European member states to require third-country firms to open 
branches within the respective member state.
24
 However, this might not necessarily be the 
most optional route for third-country service providers, as such branches are obliged to abide 
by EU rules,
25
 which may well carry the potential of imposing far too many limitations upon 
entities being used to a more lenient regulatory framework. Moreover, sufficient cross-border 
supervisory authority cooperation mechanisms must be set in place, and the respective entity 
must meet European standards in terms of capital requirements and staff standards.
26
 Given 
these prerequisites, the establishment of branches within the EU will not be a viable option for 
entities established in jurisdictions whose regulatory frameworks provide for drastically 
different standards, as adherence to EU rules might prove to be infeasible. Moreover, 
branches are even less attractive to entities which interact with European clients only on 
occasion, since a great number of intra-EU clients would need to be services to make up for 
the stark setup costs. 
Nonetheless, MiFID II also allows for reverse solicitation, which, importantly, is 
acknowledged as a right of third-country undertakings as opposed to a mere option at the 
discretion of individual member states’ supervisory authorities. Where European member 
states are given the ability to choose between different legal treatments applicable to 
                                                 
21
 Veil Rüdiger, "Produktintervention im Finanzdienstleistungsrecht: Systematik, Dogmatik und 
Grundsatzfragen der neuen Aufsichtsbefugnisse [Product intervention in financial services law: systematic, 
dogmatic and fundamental issues of the new supervision powers] ," in Bankrechtstag [Banking Law Day] 2017, 
ed. Peter O. Mülbert (Berlin: De Gruyterpp, 2017), pp.166-167. 
22
 Judgment in Omega, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614, para.27. 
23
 Supra note 16, para.48. 
24
 Supra note 9, Article 39. 
25
 Pierre E. Berger and Olivier Van den Broeke, "Enter Brexit: What is the Impact of the Financial Services 
Industry?" International Company and Commercial Law Review 28(2017): pp.211-212. Available on: Thomson 
Reuters Westlaw. Accessed 1 May 2019. 
26
 Supra note 9, Article 39. 
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individual firms, the potential level of harmonisation across various EU jurisdictions remains 
dramatically low. 
Reverse solicitation under MiFID II, on the other hand, is reserved for all third-country firms 
notwithstanding individual EU supervisor’s reservations. In this regard one must highlight the 
importance of the level of harmonisation achieved by MiFID II, as the failure of MiFID I to 
provide for a harmonised approach towards non-EU financial service providers resulted into a 
highly fragmented set of rules different from one member state to the other.
27, 28
 Nowadays, 
however, third-country financial service providers enjoy a great level or legal certainty, with 
reverse solicitation rules being harmonised across the whole of the EU. The current level of 
harmonisation, however, remains questionable and shall be assessed under the following 
sections. 
  
                                                 
27
 Heinrich Nemeczek and Sebastian Pitz, "Cross-Border Business of UK Credit Institutions and Investment 
Firms with German Clients in light of Brexit, MiFIR and MiFID II," European Business Law Review 29(2018): 
p.443. Available on: Kluwer Law Online. Accessed 2 February 2019. 
28
 European Securities and Markets Authority. MiFID II / MiFIR Third Country Regime, Placing of Trading 
Screens in the EU and Lack of Temporary Suspension Regime for the Trading Obligation for Derivatives, p.2. 
Available on: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-156-
236_letter_to_the_commission_on_mifid_ii_third_country_regime.pdf. Accessed 15 February 2019. 
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 NOTION OF REVERSE SOLICITATION 2.
The concept of reverse solicitation is incorporated under Article 42 of MiFID II, which 
provides that 
where a retail client or professional client … initiates at its own exclusive initiative the 
provision of an investment service or activity by a third-country firm, the requirement for 
authorisation … shall not apply to the provision of that service or activity … including a 
relationship specifically relating to the provision of that service or activity. An initiative by 
such clients shall not entitle the third-country firm to market … new categories of 
investment products or investment services to that client.
29
 
In essence, financial service providers need not seek approval or a licence from intra-EU 
authorities prior to rendering services to clients from within the Union, provided the client 
approached the firm and requested the service on their "own exclusive initiative"
30
. Article 42 
therefore appears akin to the notion of passporting, further analysed under subsequent 
sections, while also introducing a number of particular restrictions third-country firms need to 
abide by. 
When considering the reverse solicitation regime, provided the EU-based client approached 
the investment firm on their "own exclusive initiative", the provision of services to that 
particular client will be seen as having taken place outside the borders of the Union,
31
 and 
thus no longer being subject to EU legislation. Granted, by falling outside the European 
regulatory framework, certain service recipients might inadvertently be exposed to unintended 
risks, as foreign jurisdictions might not provide for equally preferable investor protection 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, given the "own exclusive initiative" aspect of reverse solicitation, 
one may well presume the EU client is acting with sufficient care and thus must be aware of 
the inherent risks. Consequently, the service provider no longer needs to comply with EU law 
insofar as, for example, capital adequacy thresholds are concerned. 
Whereas reverse solicitation is by no means the sole entry point to the European market for 
third-country entities, it provides for the smallest burden of regulatory requirements. By 
relying on the reverse solicitation exemption, non-EU service providers are given the 
opportunity to decrease the heavy cost burden generally associated with initiating business 
within the EU. Just to name a few, European capital and other standards could well prove to 
be too heavy of a burden for entities established in other jurisdictions seeking to merely 
perform occasional transactions with EU clients. Therefore, the reverse solicitation notion 
appears to achieve a somewhat level playing field. 
Indeed, given that the current reverse solicitation regime does not require the establishment of 
branches, acquisition of licences or gaining any other regulatory green light from European 
authorities, it remains the most straightforward way into the European market. Nonetheless, 
reverse solicitation is subject to a plethora of restrictions non-EU undertakings must take into 
account to maintain their ability to rely on Article 42 MiFID II. 
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 RETAIL OR PROFESSIONAL CLIENTS 2.1.
Article 42 of MiFID II further stipulates that it applies to services rendered to either retail or 
professional clients. Accordingly, third-country entities need not differentiate between retail 
and professional clients when rendering services in accordance with the reverse solicitation 
regime. Still, analysis pertaining to this distinction shall be utilised under Section No. 4. 
Retail clients, as per Article 4(1)(11) of MiFID II are persons which do not fall under the 
scope of professional clients. Professional clients, on the other hand, are outlined in great 
detail under Annex II of MiFID II,
32
 which provides for an exhaustive list of entities deemed 
to be apt for exposures to larger risks when compared to retail clients. Should an entity adhere 
to the standards under Annex II, it will allow for the presumption that the client is indeed a 
professional entity.  
As per Annex II of MiFID II, professional clients are entities which possess a substantial 
professional and educational background allowing them to make educated assessments of 
their investment choices,
33
 in particular in relation to the inherent risk level for the respective 
investment type. Taking into account these characteristics, MiFID II presumes that such 
entities are well suited to opt for suitable investment choices and are able to make the right 
call when soliciting financial services and products. 
The first four paragraphs of Annex II of MiFID II provide for an exhaustive list of entities 
which are presumed to be per se professional clients. These include, inter alia, such players of 
the financial market as credit institutions and institutional investors, as well as undertakings 
whose financial stability is of sufficient quality.
34
 Thresholds in terms of the financial stability 
of would-be professional clients can be explained by the legislators' intent to ensure that 
merely persons that may well weather the toughest of financial crises are able to be treated as 
professional clients and thus be exposed to higher risk levels, albeit carrying higher potential 
returns. 
Oddly enough, MiFID II additionally provides for the right of per se professional clients to be 
requested to be treated as mere retail clients, therefore allowing such clients to enjoy equal 
safeguards as those applicable to retail clients,
35
 which, as indicated above, enjoy a great 
detail of investor protection measures. Nonetheless, MiFID II further stipulates that such 
differing modes of treatment depend on the professional client’s own request,36 and the 
particulars of such arrangement are to be further dealt with under an explicit agreement 
defining the scope and extent of such request.
37
 However, once requested by the professional 
client, MiFID II does not provide for any other recourse than to afford additional protection 
measures. This re-categorisation regime is of importance for large undertakings, which do not 
operate in financial markets on a professional basis, and thus might not be able to determine a 
well-balanced investment path. 
Similarly, client re-categorisation rules also permit retail clients to be treated as professional 
ones, provided their experience in financial dealings conform to certain criteria, their 
investment portfolio is of a sufficiently large size, or the respective client has a professional 
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and thus also education backgrounds in the area of finance.
38
 Much like with the 
transformation from per se professional to retail clients, the transition from retail to 
professional client classification regime is also to be initiated on the basis of an explicit 
written request from the retail client. The investment firm, subsequently, is obliged to 
highlight the particular risks the upcoming professional client would thereafter be exposed 
to.
39
 
Particular attention ought to be paid to the ban imposed upon service providers granting 
incentives for retail clients to facilitate their requests to be treated as professional client. 
Moreover, MiFID II prohibits the incorporation of such requests under existing contracts 
concluded between the firm and the client, instead calling for the entry into a separate 
agreement.
40
 First, such incentives on the part of the undertaking will inevitably violate the 
existing investor protection concerns, since firms are seen as possessing a significantly 
broader wealth of knowledge, and thus might well abuse the existing knowledge dissymmetry 
to incorrectly convince the retail client that being treated as a professional client would prove 
to be more beneficial to the client. Given the overall requirement for service providers to act 
in the interests of the client,
41
 sufficient safeguards must be put in place to ensure compliance 
with this notion. Moreover, by imposing the requirement to have such request stated in a 
wholly separate and explicit document, MiFID II further ensures that these requests cannot be 
incorporated as a mere footnote within a broader agreement, which retail clients might well 
not notice and thus consequently become a professional client by accident. 
As noted above, these restrictions additionally fall in line with the overall duty of financial 
service providers to act in the interests of their clients.
42
 The concept, inter alia, provides for 
the need to ensure that clients, depending on their category, receive services best suited for 
them. The requirement to act in the interests of clients is particularly important when dealing 
with mere retail clients, which are deemed to lack a suitably high degree of competence vis-à-
vis financial services and instruments, therefore bringing about the need of client 
categorisation. The concept thus provides that undertakings are to utilise the knowledge and 
competence of their personnel in a responsible, diligent and careful manner,
43
 therefore 
avoiding situations of gross negligence or ill intent. Consequently, should the undertaking 
regard the retail client as lacking the needed level of expertise vis-à-vis the particular financial 
service or product, the firm must disregard the retail client's request to be treated as a 
professional client. 
Moreover, the client re-categorisation rules do not permit a mere high-level examination on 
the part of the firm. A presumption that the particular retail client truly possesses the 
necessary level of competence purely on the grounds that the respective person meets any one 
of the professional client criterion cannot prevail over the financial firm's obligation to 
nonetheless undertake a diligent examination of the retail client's suitability.
44
 Instead of 
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permitting a mere prima facie presumption that the retail client requesting to be treated as a 
professional client, firms are under the obligation to undertake an extensive assessment of the 
competencies of the particular client to ensure the client is capable of making calculated and 
risk-appropriate investment choices with little to no assistance from the undertaking.
45
  
Consequently, even under scenarios wherein retail clients themselves certify that they adhere 
to standards applicable to professional clients, firms must still perform a thorough assessment. 
Even the slightest degree of doubt in assessing submissions of the retail client requesting to be 
treated as a professional client has been suggested as amounting to sufficient grounds to 
require further evidence gathering operations.
46
 Whereas these in-depth examinations 
undoubtedly provide for additional bureaucratic barriers for financial service providers, the 
overall notion of investor protection rules prevail over the comparatively minor encumbrances 
borne by financial firms. 
Given that particular investment services and products may be rendered to only professional 
clients, and given the above outlined procedure for retail clients to be dealt with as 
professional clients and vice-versa, financial service provides ought to beware of the 
distinctions as laid down by MiFID II. The above regime will become of great importance for 
non-EU entities operating within the Union’s markets on the basis of reverse solicitation, 
should MiFID II undergo a revision in accordance with section No. 6 of this work. 
 NOTION OF "OWN EXCLUSIVE INITIATIVE" 2.2.
The phrase "own exclusive initiative" as used under Article 42 of MiFID II is of particularly 
uncertain nature. Whereas the legislator has not provided for a concrete definition of how 
exactly to interpret this concept, the phrase by and large prohibits third-country firms from 
advertising their services within the Union and thereafter rendering the respective services to 
clients from the EU. As outlined under the above section No. 2.1, such advertising and 
incentivising prohibitions are applied in relation to retail and professional clients alike. The 
suitability of the current non-differentiation approach, however, shall be addressed under 
subsequent chapters. 
2.2.1. Marketing 
Much for the detriment of third-country firms operating on the basis of reverse solicitation, 
neither Article 42, nor Recitals 85 and 111 of MiFID II list sufficient criteria as to what 
exactly the concept of marketing entails. 
When considering the notion of "own exclusive initiative" in conjunction with Recital 85 of 
MiFID II, and marketing impediments under Article 42 of MiFID II, additional issues arise.
47
 
As per Recital 85, the respective client will be deemed to have approached the third-country 
investment firm and subsequently solicited its service on their own initiative, provided the 
client had not been influenced by "personalised communication"
48
 containing either an 
invitation to conclude a contract, or aimed at persuading the client to enter into such 
relationship with the financial service provider.
49
 It further stipulates that marketing activities 
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that are both "general and addressed to the public or a large group or category of clients"
50
 
will not amount to prohibited activities, and pursuing such actions will not impede the firm 
from utilising Article 42 of MiFID II. At a first glance, Recital 85 of MiFID II thus seems to 
negate the marketing restrictions on the basis of the "own exclusive initiative" concept. 
In relation to the above, it is of importance to stress the use of particular words under Recital 
85 of MiFID II. First, it renders "personalised communication" inaccessible for non-EU firms. 
Instead, undertakings are to rely on advertising materials of general nature in terms of both 
the target audience, and the contents of such marketing activities. Moreover, any such 
marketing material may not contain a direct invitation to treat. However, at the same time 
Recital 85 prohibits promotions which "may influence the client"
51
. Given the very goal of 
any marketing material, i.e. the attainment of additional clientele and the general promotion of 
a particular firm's services or products, Recital 85 appears to both allow and prohibit third-
country service providers from undertaking marketing activities. Nonetheless, when read in 
conjunction with the latter part of Recital 85, marketing activities of general nature advertised 
to the general public, apparently, will not be seen as having the effect of influencing its target 
audience. 
Additionally, Recital 85 not only covers marketing towards the public, but also "larger group 
or category of clients"
52
. In terms of "the public", European financial services law generally 
refers to an unlimited number of addressees. At the same time, groups of clients or categories 
of clients have been suggested to merely include no more than 150 advertising recipients. 
Notwithstanding, the concept has also been analysed in conjunction with an assessment of the 
underlying client-company relationship. Hence, for example, circumstances wherein more 
than one half of clients targeted by such marketing activities are not known to the service 
provider, i.e. there is no underlying relationship between the two persons, it should be seen as 
targeting "the public".
53
 Whereas it is difficult to argue in support of either approach over the 
other, a mix of the two could well be incorporated in upcoming EU Directives, whereby both 
a minimum threshold of targets and the underlying past relationships would be of importance. 
The use of "larger", however, adds an additional element to the marketing restriction, as 
groups or categories of just 150 advertising recipients might well be deemed to fall short of 
the notion of "larger groups". MiFID II does not, however, provide for any further guidance in 
relation to Recital 85. Moreover, client categorisation is of essence also for the interpretation 
of "own exclusive initiative", since Recital 85 of MiFID II permits general marketing 
activities towards "a larger … category of clients"54 without yet again differentiating between 
retail and professional clients. 
Last, but not least, these advertising activities are permitted only insofar as they are per se 
general. It consequently follows that MiFID II imposes an obligation of sorts requiring such 
marketing activities to be obviously general without requiring any further review or analysis. 
Should the third-country entity have to resort to an in-depth analysis to prove its marketing 
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activities are, indeed, "by their very nature general"
55
, this aspect will not have been abided by 
and the firm would be found to have exceeded the scope of Recital 85.   
However, as suggested by scholarly writing, the scope of Recital 85 is very much different 
from Article 42 of MiFID II. Instead of referring specifically to third-country firms, Recital 
85 of MiFID II only uses the term "firms". Consequently, it could be argued that Recital 85 is 
not a mistake, and instead refers to marketing activities undertaken by European financial 
services providers.
56
 Nonetheless, such interpretation is not entirely consistent with the rest of 
MiFID II, for reverse solicitation is only utilised in relation to Article 42 of MiFID II. The 
scope of Article 42, as previously described, however, is restricted to third-country entities, 
therefore expressly excluding intra-EU entities aiming for a pan-European distribution 
network without using some other arrangement, say, their European "passports". 
The wording of Recital 85 specifies the provision of services "at the initiative of a client"
57
, 
causing only further confusion. The aforesaid phrase is used only once throughout MiFID II, 
namely, it has only been incorporated under Recital 85 itself. Nowhere else throughout the 
text of MiFID II is this concept utilised. However, it does appear to be strikingly similar to the 
concept of "own exclusive initiative" as provided for under Article 42. Consequently, Recital 
85 increasingly appears to be a mere afterthought inserted into the text of MiFID II at the very 
last minute. Nonetheless, in analysis MiFID II, and paying particular attention to the overall 
spirit and more specifically the wording of Article 42, Recital 85 appears to be intended to be 
applied in relation to non-EU entities. On the basis of the aforementioned, it is hereby 
submitted that Recital 85 is not to be read as referring to European entities, and must instead 
be interpreted as covering the marketing and promotional activities of non-EU firms. 
Consequently, marketing restrictions stemming from Article 42 of MiFID II are at least 
partially nullified in terms of general promotional activities absent references to particular 
services and products offered by the respective third-country firm. 
Notwithstanding the means via which marketing and promotional material is disseminated, 
i.e. by the third-country firm itself or any person acting on the behalf or in the interests of the 
undertaking, marketing will be deemed to have taken place. Moreover, it is of no importance 
whether the firm or its intermediaries execute promotional activities in the presence of the 
client, over the phone or via internet advertising material published within the EU.
58
 Thus, 
ESMA views the term "marketing" as encompassing the widest possible array of activities 
with no regard to the particular circumstances of the client-firm encounter. 
In light of the apparent chaos caused by the interplay of Article 42, Recital 111, and Recital 
85 of MiFID II, the importance of issues pertaining to marketing activities is only further 
amplified. With seemingly contrary permitted marketing regimes incorporated within the 
same exact legal document, MiFID II appears to barely shed any light upon the issue. Be that 
as it may, in view of the author recent scholarly discourse provides for an interpretation that is 
not entirely aligned with the overall nature of MiFID II. 
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2.2.2. Temporal effect of marketing restrictions 
MiFID II also causes only further chaos by failing to define the temporal effect of the 
marketing, promotion and solicitation ban. One could well argue that Article 42 of MiFID II 
should be read as covering advertising activities of third-country entities only following the 
entry into force and subsequent application date of MiFID II. This is further confirmed by the 
interpretation of "new categories of investment products or investment services"
59
 as analysed 
under section No. 2.2 of this thesis, whereby the prohibition to offer supplementary services 
applies from 3 January 2018 onwards only.
60
 Should that not be the case, non-EU firms face 
the potential threat of being barred from ever accessing the EU market on the basis of reverse 
solicitation purely because of marketing activities that had taken place decades ago. Such 
interpretation would subsequently give rise to questions pertaining to concepts of 
proportionality and suitability, which, in the view of the author, would not have been adhered 
to. 
However, MiFID II only goes as far as to stipulate that prior marketing and promotional 
activities within the EU will prevent third-country firms from relying on the concept of 
reverse solicitation.
61
 One ought to note that MiFID II refers to marketing and promoting of 
"investment services or activities"
62
 as opposed to specifying the scope of such activities only 
to the financial services provided to the respective EU-based client. Thus, MiFID II imposes 
an overall and general ban on third-country firm advertising within the Union,
63
 preventing 
the use of reverse solicitation even in cases where the non-EU firm advertised, say, the 
provision of investment advice, whereas the client approaching the firm requests portfolio 
management services or other wholly separate financial service or product. The extent of this 
limitation, however, is somewhat curtailed by taking into account Recital 85 of MiFID II. 
Even though in the above-mentioned example the advertised service is an entirely different 
financial service from the one actually requested by the client, MiFID II does not regard such 
distinction as sufficient grounds to permit the use of reverse solicitation. Thus, following 
MiFID II, no advertising activities of third-country undertakings, even ones merely 
referencing financial services provided by the firm, may be undertaken within the EU. 
2.2.3. Marketing towards retail and professional clients 
As described under chapter No. 2.1 relating to service and product recipient categories, 
MiFID II does not differentiate between marketing restrictions in relation to retail and 
professional clients. Therefore, non-EU entities are subject to equally restrictive promotional 
regimes when interacting with either retail or professional entities. Notwithstanding, it has 
been argued that generic firm advertising material can be disseminated throughout the Union 
with little concern,
64
 provided they do not refer to particular services and products offered by 
the firm. Thus view is only further bolstered by taking into account the above review of 
Recital 85 of MiFID II, which further clarifies the otherwise hazy line between permitted and 
prohibited marketing activities. 
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In addition, taking into account the further distinction in relation to "new categories of 
investment products or investment services"
65
, which prohibits the firm from offering 
additional services not requested by the client on their "own exclusive initiative", such 
marketing activities may not be directed towards the client even in the performance of the 
original service requested by the client. In terms of marketing, the current MiFID II regime is 
at odds with the presumption that activities rendered under reverse solicitation are not deemed 
to have been performed within the territory of the EU. Namely, Recital 111 leads to the 
apparently false presumption that promotional activities directed at the client within the 
existing relationship between the client and the third-country entity would also be seen as 
having been provided outside the EU. This separation therefore creates a distinction between 
marketing towards potential would-be clients of the third-country service provider, and 
promotion of additional services within the wider framework of the existing client-firm 
relationship once the provision of services has already been initiated by the client on their 
"own exclusive initiative". 
 PROVISION OF "NEW CATEGORIES OF INVESTMENT PRODUCTS OR 2.3.
INVESTMENT SERVICES" 
As per Article 42 of MiFID II, reverse solicitation does not extend to the provision or 
marketing of "new categories of investment products or investment services to that client"
66
 
within the scope of the existing client-firm relationship based on reverse solicitation. The 
different investment service categories are laid out under Annex I of MiFID II, which 
differentiates between and sets forth core and ancillary services.
67
 Notwithstanding the 
separation between product and service classes under MiFID II, this aspect is of no relevance 
for non-EU service providers. 
Considering the aforementioned restriction, it becomes clear that the "own exclusive 
initiative" of the client is to be assessed on every single instance when performing a 
transaction. At the same time, it is not necessarily clear whether the same service once already 
solicited by the service recipient according to the MiFID II regime under Article 42,
68
 since 
the Directive neither confirms, nor outright bans such activities. Whereas theoretically 
permissible, the continued performance of the same exact service may still run contrary to the 
requirement for the client to have solicited the service on their own. Moreover, it is likely to 
draw closer regulatory scrutiny,
69
 given the overarching marketing restrictions and the 
likelihood of varying perceptions in terms of the concept of marketing. 
Contrary to claims calling for the extension of Article 42 of MiFID II in relation to new 
services and products offered to clients on the basis of a relationship once already legitimately 
established,
70
 say, wherein the client approaches the third-country firm on their own exclusive 
initiative, and the non-EU entity subsequently offers additional services, such approach would 
obviously violate the MiFID II regime. Nonetheless, as argued elsewhere throughout the 
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thesis, such approach might not necessarily be of detriment when applied in relation to per se 
professional clients only. 
Crucially, however, guidance issued by ESMA affirms the temporal effect of the prohibition 
in relation to promotion of additional services. By considering that the ban only applies to 
services and products rendered following the application of MiFID II,
71
 ESMA confirmed that 
past conduct by non-EU entities may not inhibit their ability to fully utilise Article 42 of 
MiFID II. This analysis can subsequently also be applied to the marketing restriction, thus 
establishing that marketing activities performed within the EU prior to MIFID II would not 
bar third-country service providers from relying on the reverse solicitation regime. 
At the same time, however, ESMA regards the provision of different services following 3 
January 2018 than those rendered prior to the date as a prohibited activity.
72
 Consequently, in 
considering the ban on promoting additional product and service categories, should a retail or 
professional client, approach a third-country firm with a request to provide, say, portfolio 
management services, the respective undertaking may not permit the provision of additional 
services or offer the client to provide further activities. The aforesaid example presumes the 
above-described restrictions in terms of activities prohibited under reverse solicitation have 
been abided by. The first prohibition would consequently breach the ban in relation to "new 
categories of investment products or investment services"
73
. The second restriction in the 
promotion of further services by the firm to the client, as outlined under section No. 2.3 of 
this work, would run counter to the prohibition to market services to EU clients. 
In considering whether additional services have been promoted towards an EU-based client, 
ESMA yet again foresees an in-depth examination on a case-by-case basis. First, such 
analysis would subsequently provide for an assessment as to the type of service or product 
being offered within the scope of the existing transaction. Second, the nature of the service or 
product would have to be assessed, taking into account the inherent risk level and complexity 
of the products.
74
 Third-country firms must clearly differentiate between the various product 
classes and categories on the basis of the above criteria to reduce the possibility of regulatory 
arbitrage and misuse of Article 42 of MiFID II in undermining EU law regulations. 
However, once a particular client has approached the firms on their "own exclusive initiative" 
for the provision of a particular service, the non-EU entity is entitled to market towards that 
particular client services and products of similar enough nature. As pointed out above, the 
particular comparison between services and products once already provided, and those 
subsequently offered within the boundaries of the already-existing relationship is to be 
performed time and time again when assessing different circumstances. Nonetheless, ESMA 
has provided for some much-needed guidance in this regard by setting the scope of services 
and products belonging to different categories, stipulating that "a subordinated bond does not 
belong to the same category as a plain-vanilla debt instrument"
75
. While this comment might 
be based on a scenario wherein the differences are quite obvious, ESMA has refrained from 
sharing its interpretation of circumstances that would not be quite as obvious. 
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 EFFECT OF THE CURRENT REVERSE SOLICITATION REGIME 2.4.
As provided by the previous subchapters, reverse solicitation under the current Article 42 of 
MiFID II allows non-EU financial service providers to enter into transactions with Union-
based clients without facing any regulatory entry hurdles. However, the regime in its present 
iteration consists of a total of five distinct components third-country entities must first take 
into account. 
First and foremost, non-EU firms need not differentiate between the two client categories, as 
reverse solicitation may be utilised when dealing with both retail and professional clients. 
Similarly, the reverse solicitation concept does not impose any further limitations in terms of 
per se professional clients, at-request retail, and at-request professional clients. Thus, 
whenever European clients solicit financial services on their own exclusive initiate, third-
country firms need not carry out any examination in this regard. 
Nonetheless, the aforesaid requirement for the client to have solicited the particular service or 
product "on their own initiative" carries a great deal of limitations stemming from the MiFID 
II marketing regime. First and foremost, MiFID II appears to generate a blanket ban on any 
sort of client solicitation, marketing or other promotional activities within the Union as 
undertaken by the third-country firm. However, following an analysis of Recital 85 of MiFID 
II, the Directive appears to have provided for sufficient legal basis for non-EU undertakings to 
engage in promotional activities of highly general nature without incorporating concrete 
offers or other incentives for European clients to enter into contracts with the respective firm. 
Additionally, the "own exclusive initiative" aspect further seems to bar the service provider 
from offering the European client to enter into yet another contract for the provision of a 
service wholly different from the one originally solicited by the client pursuant to the Article 
42 regime. Nonetheless, one could still argue for the possibility to still offer the repeated 
provision of the same exact service originally sought after by the Union-based client.  
As follows from the above considerations, Article 42 of MiFID II provides for a seemingly 
unfettered framework for access to European clients. However, the exceptionally vague use of 
language in setting up the scope of the most important aspects forming the reverse solicitation 
regime evidently is a major shortcoming of the Directive. In absence of any concrete EU-wide 
regulatory guidance providing interpretation of any one of the aforesaid considerations, third-
country financial service providers get to enjoy an exceptionally meagre level of legal 
certainty. In turn, failure to ensure a sufficient degree of legal certainty renders the reverse 
solicitation regime under MiFID II far too risky for entities licenced under non-EU 
jurisdictions. Consequently, even those few third-country firms choosing to operate on the 
basis of reverse solicitation would still face immense regulatory risks due to differences in 
national member state regulatory authorities' interpretations of each one of the five concepts. 
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 REVERSE SOLICITATION UNDER AIFMD 3.
Much like with financial services and products under MiFID II, alternative investment funds, 
governed by the AIFMD, underwent significant changes following the 2008 financial 
meltdown. In efforts to mitigate the negative consequences of future financial markets’ 
disasters, AIFMD imposes certain restrictions in relation to alternative investment fund 
managers (hereinafter: AIFMs), i.e., persons who manage alternative investment funds 
(hereinafter: AIFs).
76
 AIFs, on the other hand, are undertakings for collective investment, 
which simultaneously "raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it"
77
, 
and simultaneously are not covered by Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities
78 
(hereinafter: UCITS).
79
 In essence, the scope of AIFMD is limited to funds investing in a 
wide variety of targets not covered under the UCITS directive.
80
 The UCITS regime, 
however, does not envision an equally liberal approach in terms of third-country service 
providers intending to render services within the EU,
81
 and thus shall not be addressed under 
this work. 
For the purposes of the AIFMD, marketing as per Article 4(1)(x) of AIFMD is deemed to 
amount to the "offering or placement … of units … of an AIF"82. Whereas there is no such 
explicit equivalent of Article 42 MiFID II incorporated under the AIFMD, the notion of 
reverse solicitation stems from the definition of marketing. Namely, non-EU AIFMs 
managing AIFs too are entitled to allow European clients to invest into AIFs under their 
control provided the client approached them on their own initiative.
83
 It is yet again of 
importance to highlight the difference between reverse solicitation under MiFID II and 
AIFMD, wherein the former provides for an explicit right for third-country service providers 
to utilise the reverse solicitation regime, whereas reverse solicitation is only implied under the 
latter Directive.
84
 Notwithstanding this difference, the two reverse solicitation regimes are still 
inherently one and the same. Thus, whereas AIFMD only relates to a particular set of 
undertakings dealing with a highly specific set of financial instruments and mechanisms, 
reverse solicitation under AIFMD is based on the same cornerstone principles and thus remain 
relevant for the interpretation of Article 42 of MiFID II. 
Similarly to MiFID II, AIFMD remains silent when it comes to providing a more concrete 
explanation as to under what scenarios would a non-EU AIFM still be able to rely on reverse 
solicitation, i.e., under what circumstances a particular intra-EU client will be seen as having 
                                                 
76
 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers. 
77
 Ibid., Article 4(1)(a). 
78
 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities. 
79
 Bentley, supra note 2, pp.42-43. 
80
 European Securities and Markets Authority.  Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities, pp.47-78. Available 
on: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-
report_on_trends_risks_and_vulnerabilities_no1_2019.pdf. Accessed 4 April 2019. 
81
 Moloney, supra note 3, p.307. 
82
 Supra note 76, Article 4(1)(x). 
83
 Bentley, supra note 2, pp.47-48. 
84
 Dr. Akexandros L. Seretakis, "Brexit and Alternative Investment Fund Managers," Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 2019: p.143. Available on: HeinOnline. Accessed 15 May 2019. 
19 
 
approached the AIFM at their own discretion. As has been suggested in scholarly writing, the 
fine line between reverse solicitation and prior marketing activities breaching AIFMD is 
particularly tricky, even more so considering that the potential negative consequences include 
civil, administrative and even at times criminal liability, depending on the particular 
jurisdiction.
85
 Moreover, such breach on part of the AIFM might well give rise to the client 
having a claim against the AIFM for inefficient managing of the fund in relation to the breach 
of AIFMD.
86
 Considering both the implied nature of reverse solicitation under the AIFMD, 
and the heavy-handed sanctions for breaches, AIFMD provides for a worse regulatory regime 
when compared to that stemming from MiFID II.  
 NOTION OF "MARKETING" UNDER AIFMD 3.1.
Given that reverse solicitation is not explicitly defined under the AIFMD, and instead it 
follows from a closer interpretation of the notion of marketing under the directive, national 
laws transposing the AIFMD might well provide for an entirely different view.
87, 88
 In this 
regard, Article 42 of MiFID II provides for a significantly higher degree of harmonisation, as 
reverse solicitation is not an implied approach reserved for non-EU entities. On the one hand, 
it affords third-country firms a greater degree of legal certainty when providing services to 
European clients. On the other hand, firms are likely to be seen as legitimate actors lawfully 
accessing EU clients, instead of having to rely on regulatory arbitrage and its exploitative 
nature. 
When assessing reverse solicitation under AIFMD, as expressed further under sections of this 
thesis, AIFMD does not expressly provide for an equivalent regime to that incorporated under 
Article 42 of MiFID II. Instead, the possibility for non-EU entities to utilise reverse 
solicitation depends upon the various national laws transposing the AIFMD into the 
respective local regulatory framework.
89
 National transposition, however, might well 
incorrectly define the notion of marketing, and fail to allow for reverse solicitation in the 
respective jurisdiction.
90
 The national transposition mechanism can additionally introduce 
further requirements or restrictions via the so-call "gold-plating" approach,
91
 whereby new 
measures not provided for by the AIFMD are brought about by national legislators. Even in 
absence of "gold-plating", seemingly trivial new measures introduced by EU member states 
result in substantial compliance issues for financial undertakings operating across the 
European market.
92
 The following shall provide a brief review of the national frameworks in 
force in the United Kingdom (hereinafter: UK), Germany, and France, the three largest 
European economies which subsequently have the most active financial markets. 
When assessing the particular laws of the UK, the notion of marketing activities becomes 
easily definable. The approach of UK's regulatory authority, the Financial Conduct Authority 
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(hereinafter: FCA) is hereby submitted as solid example in terms of approaching reverse 
solicitation under the AIFMD. In view of the FCA, for one, marketing of AIF units amounts 
to "making a unit of share of an AIF available for purchase"
93
.
94
 Moreover, the mere offering 
of such possibility to acquire extended towards a potential client, and an invitation to 
conclude a contract will equally trigger the licencing requirement.
95, 96
 Notwithstanding this 
peculiarity, the current AIFM framework in the UK is limited to marketing activities aimed at 
the particular AIF.
97
 If the AIFM where to market a wholly separate AIFM, as per the letter of 
the law, the third-country AIFM could well continue to rely on the reverse solicitation 
exemption.
98
 Additionally, general marketing activities are thus deemed to fall outside the 
scope of AIFMD restrictions. 
Moreover, the use of the "making … available for purchase"99 aspect must be placed under 
closer scrutiny. As has been suggested by scholars, insofar as potential EU-based clients are 
informed about the AIF under the management of the non-EU AIFM without offering the 
client to purchase them, this strategy would thus not amount to marketing activities, and 
should instead be seen as "pre-marketing".
100, 101
 As opposed to straightforward marketing, 
pre-marketing is not covered by either AIFMD or MiFID II, and thus are currently prohibited 
under neither directive. MiFID II imposes restrictions in terms of soliciting, marketing and 
promotional activities directed towards European clients, but does not refer to similar 
activities falling short of marketing. Given that the AIFMD too provides for similar treatment 
of third-country entities providing services within the EU, the insights stemming from the 
AIFMD might come in handy when determining the scope of MiFID II restrictions. However, 
it could well be argued that pre-marketing activities are by and large identical to promotion 
under Recital 85 of MiFID II, i.e. activities inherently general and not targeting individual 
clients.
102
  
Nevertheless, the FCA's opinion as regards publicly available data is particularly odd in the 
age of digitalisation. As per the FCA, applications or other material needed for the conclusion 
of an agreement accessed on an open website of an AIFM by a client who thereafter decides 
in favour of entering into a transaction with the AIFM, would violate the reverse solicitation 
method.
103
 This, in turn, requires potential service providers to conceal parts of their public 
websites from site visitors domiciled in the UK.
104
 Should this interpretation be scrutinised, 
one must first take into account that offers for purchase are banned by default. Consequently, 
by presenting concrete agreements to the client enabling the entry into a transaction, the 
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AIFM would violate the scope of pre-marketing. As clearly indicated under preceding 
paragraphs, this must not, however, be interpreted as some overall ban on general marketing 
which does not incorporate an offer to acquire AIF units. 
German law, however, provides for a broader interpretation of activities amounting to 
"marketing", for it covers both concrete offers to conclude a contract directed at the specific 
client, and general marketing activities.
105
 By referring not only to invitations to enter into 
contracts and even marketing in general, non-EU AIFMs find themselves even more 
constrained. Without differentiating between the various methods a third-country entity might 
market its activities towards clients residing in Germany, be it solicitation in person, over the 
phone or via electronic means, including advertising materials on publicly accessible 
websites, Germany aims to prohibit activities with the aim of influencing the client into 
purchasing the provider's services or products. As restrictive as it may be, it has ensured 
applicability and relevance over the years, having withstood technological developments 
granting service providers additional channels to reach potential clients.
106
 However, this 
interpretation of marketing should not necessarily be extended to MiFID II, given that its 
Recital 85, at least in theory, provides for a wide array of exemptions.  
Going even beyond the approach of German regulators, France has defined marketing in even 
broader terms, stipulating that it includes "presenting them on French territory … with a view 
to encouraging an investor to subscribe for or purchase"
107
 units in the AIF.
108
 Whereas it 
comes short of specifying the particular documentation which would permit non-European 
AIFMs to rely on reverse solicitation,
109
 the geographical scope of the marketing ban of 
importance for reverse solicitation is of immense assistance. Consequently, marketing 
activities outside the territory of France, even if targeting specifically French nationals, are 
not banned by French supervisory authorities. 
Time and time again have scholars underlined the need to acquire and ensure the proper 
maintenance of documentation from the client confirming the use of reverse solicitation under 
the AIFMD.
110
 However, at the same time, national peculiarities have to be taken into 
account, as not all European jurisdictions will permit written confirmations from the third-
country firms' clients as sufficient basis to establish that the client did indeed solicit the 
respective services on their own exclusive initiative.
111
 Furthermore, such additional 
recordkeeping burden would only add on to the other administrative considerations to be 
abided by service providers. 
Similarly, it remains questionable whether the confirmation model would adhere to the 
standards set forth by MiFID II. As described above, in terms of the existing client re-
categorisation regime, firms are under the obligation to closely scrutinise the particular retail 
client’s suitability to be treated as a professional client. Given the inability for service 
providers to rely on their clients’ own submissions, it could well be submitted that a simple 
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confirmation from the client might fall short of establishing reverse solicitation. At the same 
time, it is difficult to imagine what type of documentation exactly would suffice to confirm 
that the client approached the firm on their "own exclusive initiative". Consequently, the 
reliance on client confirmations, coupled with the firms’ adherence to marketing rules remains 
the sole possibility to establish conformity with MiFID II. However, confirmations from 
service recipients, as detailed in the following paragraphs, have their own shortcomings. 
Despite claims that mere confirmations from European clients investing into AIFs affirming 
their investments have been made on the basis of reverse solicitation would suffice to permit 
the AIFM to rely on this concept,
112
 this remains a particularly risky proposition to rely upon. 
Given the different treatment afforded depending on the particular member state in question, 
third-country AIFMs ought to exercise immense caution under the AIFMD. This aspect only 
further increases in importance considering that one of the EU's current main financial 
centres, the UK, permits reverse solicitation insofar as the non-EU AIFM has obtained from 
the EU-based client the above mentioned confirmation before the provision of services. 
Provided such affirmation has been obtained prior to the transaction, and clearly refers to both 
the particular AIF and AIFM, the FCA regards it as sufficient basis to permit the execution of 
the transaction on the basis of reverse solicitation.
113
 Nonetheless, in absence of full pan-
European harmonisation, the reverse solicitation regime still must account for national 
peculiarities. 
Additionally, as outlined above, it remains questionable how extensively such confirmations 
from EU clients could work under MiFID II. When comparing this aspect with, for example, 
the extensive due diligence process to be undertaken in case a retail clients wishes to be 
treated as a professional client on the basis of a separate request, it is doubtful that such 
confirmations from service recipients would meet the high bar of standards stemming from 
MiFID II. 
Further uncertainty is caused by doubts whether such mere affirmation from the client reflects 
the true circumstances of the particular client-firm relationship and whether such confirmation 
is in line with the investor protection concerns. Moreover, as described under the above 
chapter covering MiFID II, these and similar claims as submitted by clients must not be 
accepted at face value. Instead, financial service providers maintain the obligation to approach 
such requests with due diligence and ascertain with a sufficient degree of certainty the validity 
of such claims. 
This argument is further substantiated by the position of ESMA itself, for it has expressly 
dissuaded third-country firms from relying on documentation signed by the client affirming 
that they approached the service provider on their "own exclusive initiative".
114
 
Unfortunately, it has yet to clarify the proper way to demonstrate compliance with Article 42 
of MiFID II, instead providing for a separate analysis in reference to each single service 
rendered to the client.
115
 ESMA has, however, explained that "reverse solicitation should not 
be assumed"
116
, thus effectively deferring any arguments calling for an assumption that the 
client acted on their "own exclusive initiative" in approaching the firm. Other than requiring 
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the keeping of internal documentation substantiating the basis of client-firm relations,
117
 it is 
currently difficult to devise a bulletproof method of proving the initiative of the client. 
As highlighted by the uneven set of national restrictions, reverse solicitation for non-EU 
AIFMs is not a viable option for permanent operations. Where a number of national regulators 
have not provided for any sort of clarifications, other authorities regard the notion of 
"marketing" as encompassing a worryingly broad spectrum of activities. Consequently, the 
failure of AIFMD to harmonise the reverse solicitation regime means that non-European 
service providers would be exposed to far too many potential non-compliance risks.
118
 
Interestingly enough, the AIFMD under Recital 92 calls for further harmonisation in terms of 
the client assessment procedure even when considering the potential acquisition of AIF units 
by per se professional investors on the basis of reverse solicitation.
119
 Given how closely 
AIFMD and MiFID II are interlinked in terms of reverse solicitation, a revision MiFID II 
might well mirror that of AIFMD. This is particularly important in relation to the particular 
clause under AIFMD permitting reverse solicitation, as ensuring that it is no longer a mere 
"gap" in the law, and instead providing for an explicit definition, would afford a necessary 
degree of certainty for third-country entities operating on the basis thereof. 
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 INVESTOR PROTECTION CONCERNS 4.
As discussed above, MiFID II does not differentiate between retail and professional clients 
being serviced under reverse solicitation when laying down the aforesaid restrictions. 
However, the imposition of equally strict limitations for professional clients lacks a concrete 
legal basis. As per Annex II of MiFID II, per se professional clients need to adhere to a 
number of thresholds in terms of capital adequacy and personnel competence. Therefore, 
professional clients are well suited to be exposed to additional risks and must be granted a 
higher degree of freedom when soliciting financial services and products. Nonetheless, the 
current wording of Article 42 of MiFID II fails to provide for an appropriate set of restrictions 
applicable to third-country firms when engaging with professional clients. 
By and large, investor protection concerns are based on the clients’ trust into the system.120, 121 
Over time, the number of financial products available to retail clients, not to mention 
professional clients, has seen an immense expansion. However, alongside the positive growth 
in terms of services on offer, the risk level has also seen an increase.
122
 New products have 
their own particular inherent risks which retail investors might not have necessarily faced 
before, and thus failure to protect retail investors in terms of liquidity shortages might result 
in an increase in the overall systematic risk framework.
123
 Furthermore, this aspect becomes 
ever more important considering that services provided under Article 42 of MiFID II will be 
seen as having been executed in territories outside the Union. Therefore, the respective law of 
the third-country will become applicable, causing only further headache to retail investors.
124
 
 RESTRICTIONS IN RELATION TO RETAIL CLIENTS 4.1.
Retail client protection mechanisms, on the one hand, aim to ensure a safe financial market 
for clients which do not possess immense assets to protect them from liquidity and solvency 
concerns in times of financial instability.
125
 At the same time, the regulatory regime as of 
recently additionally aims to supplement the long-term financial stability of retail investors,
126
 
intending to improve the ability of non-professionals to build and safeguard their wealth. As 
opposed to professional entities, retail clients lack both the professional and academic 
background to properly assess the suitability of the particular investment service or product 
sought, and thus are unable to adopt the most optimum investment route.  
Moreover, retail clients access the financial markets through much different channels when 
compared to those utilised by professional clients. Retail recipients must rely on the guidance 
of intermediaries, be it their credit institution or a separate investment advisor.
127
 The use of 
such entities thus also subjects retail clients to obvious conflict-of-interest scenarios, wherein 
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intermediaries are aiming to maximise their commissions, incentives and other financial 
perks,
128
 often at the expense of the client.
129
 Combined with the increasingly complex nature 
of financial services and products, retail clients are increasingly unable to comprehend the 
slight variations between services offered to them, much to their own detriment. 
Consequently, in absence of retail client protection rules,
130
 intermediaries seeking to exploit 
their retail clients' lack of competence would thrive. 
Considering the aforementioned, MiFID II provides for the issuance of tailor-made financial 
services, adjusted on the basis of the "personal needs, characteristics and objectives"
131
. 
Failure to abide by these standards will lead to the determination that the service provider has 
failed to act in the interests of the respective client, and thus breach the firm's obligations 
towards the service or product recipient. 
On the one hand, retail and professional clients alike need to be afforded sufficient protection 
against operational failures on the part of the service provider. In absence of sufficiently 
robust regulation, clients may well see the assets they have invested disappear upon the 
winding-up of the service provider. At the same time, retail clients specifically are prone to 
suffer from predatory behaviour by financial undertakings. Thus, European markets need a 
mix of rules in terms of both prudential and systematic risks, with the former category 
catering for investor protection, whereas the second looking out for the financial stability of 
undertakings rendering the services.
132
  
Retail clients are by far most exposed to prudential issues, as they are unable to either 
appropriately judge the present risks of the firm’s services, or simply do not fully comprehend 
the severity of problems facing them. This is explained by the combination of the information 
imbalance issue, and the peculiar fiduciary relationship, whereby the firm must suppress its 
appetite for immense returns in light of certain risks.
133 
Not only do service providers possess 
a substantially broader wealth of knowledge in terms of the service to be rendered, investors 
themselves may be unaware as to what steps are to be taken to mitigate,
134
 if not fully prevent, 
whatever risks they are exposed to. 
In light of the achievement of the EU in attempts to safeguard retail investors, one may well 
benefit from taking a step back to assess whether a sufficient level has not already been 
reached, and whether further legislative action has the potential of inadvertently marching into 
an overly-regulated landscape.
135
 For one, retail clients must not be absolutely protected from 
any and all risks, as otherwise one might well call for the complete erasure of even the tiniest 
risk levels in financial services. This, consequently, is more than likely to be the driving force 
behind the further increase in purely vanilla services lacking any sort of innovation.
136
 In 
resolving this multi-dimensional issue, regard must still be had to the relative ineptness of 
retail investors, and it is not necessarily the case that retail investors should be pushed towards 
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more complex services and products that, evidently enough, they may not be suited to deal 
with. 
In efforts to ensure the proper maintenance of the fiduciary role as undertaken by service 
providers, conduct of business rules come into play. Such regulation aims to mitigate 
drawbacks arising out of the information misbalance issue, and reduce the service providers’ 
risk appetite should it become evident the client might be worse off.
137
 Consequently, these 
rules call for certain minimum thresholds to be abided by the firm’s staff prior to commencing 
activities, as well as regulate the ongoing client-firm relationship to ensure the maintenance of 
adequate client protection mechanisms throughout the transaction.
138, 139
 The rationale behind 
mandating the utilisation of appropriately-educated individuals should subsequently ensure 
that the firm will continue to uphold client protection rules notwithstanding the level of 
leadership at the respective undertaking. 
As already previously discussed, non-EU entities do not enjoy the range of freedoms as 
provided under the TFEU. Nonetheless, interpretation of permissible restrictions in terms of 
TFEU can provide much-needed assistance in assessing the suitability of current investor 
protection mechanisms. As per the CJEU in its ruling in Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio 
dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano
140
  (hereinafter: Gebhard), a total of four 
preconditions are to be abided by to ensure compliance with EU law in limiting either 
freedom stemming from the TFEU. Given the very nature of third-country service providers, 
it is evident that the first condition of non-discrimination is not fulfilled in this regard,
141
 
although it is not necessarily needed in the current examination. As noted throughout the 
work, non-EU entities need not be afforded equal rights as those enjoyed by intra-European 
undertakings, since Treaty freedoms are inherently limited to undertakings established and 
licenced within the Union.
142
 Nonetheless, the other three preconditions stemming from the 
Gebhard ruling could prove to be of use in assessing the justification of retail client protection 
mechanisms. 
First and foremost, investor protection regimes are inherently motivated by and aimed at 
ensuring sufficient safeguards to otherwise vulnerable groups. Thus, in this regard the 
requirement for the restriction to be of general interest is certainly met in relation to retail 
clients.
143
 When considering the level of exposure faced by professional clients, however, one 
must also take into account the plethora of thresholds and conditions professional clients 
abide by, therefore already highlighting one potential area of regulatory overreach.  
Second, the suitability of the measure vis-à-vis the ultimate goal pursued comes into play.144 
In this regard, too, the author is not questioning the need for retail investor protection regimes. 
Instead, criticism is exerted in terms of per se professional and professional-upon-request 
entities. As stated above, these two distinct client categories need not be given equal 
preservation measures, a problem the severity of which becomes more apparent when 
considering the evident twofold application of protection measures.  
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Last, but not least, the proportionality test is to be examined.
145
 An appropriate measure will 
only extend as far as it is needed to reach the needed goal. Any extensions beyond what is 
needed will ultimately be deemed as disproportionate, and thus fail to adhere to the Gebhard 
test. Given the aforementioned, it becomes evident that the suitability of the current MiFID II 
regime as far as professional client protection fails the Gebhard test. As stated above, the 
application of Gebhard criteria as developed by the CJEU is strictly limited to intra-EU 
matters and cannot be extended to third-country policies. However, the author believes it to be 
a useful test in arguing for the need for a differentiation between retail and professional clients 
in terms of marketing, additional service or product offering, and further service or product 
type supply. 
In addition to the Gebhard test, the CJEU's ruling in Alpine Investments BV v Minister van 
Financiën146 (hereinafter: Alpine Investments) is of relevance in terms of retail clients 
security. Whereby the CJEU stressed the close interconnectedness between market 
participants' trust in the respective financial markets, and subsequent need for appropriate 
participant protection regimes.
147
 Namely, given the immense role of investors' trust into the 
system, failure to provide for sufficient client protection mechanisms would thus erode the 
functioning of financial markets via undermining client confidence. Consequently, while in 
Alpine Investments the CJEU concluded that restrictions in one EU member state aimed at the 
protection of clients in a wholly separate member state cannot be substantiated according to 
EU law, such activities were nonetheless found to comply with the prerequisite of "general 
interest".
148, 149 
 
Notwithstanding the CJEU's relative reluctance in expressly substantiating that investor 
protection truly amounts to an activity of general interest,
150
 its remarks and final ruling in 
Alpine Investments should serve as sufficient basis to confirm the aforesaid. Consequently, 
whereas retail clients are in need of a wide variety of measures aimed at safeguarding the 
group, applying equal ones in terms of professional clients would fail to conform to the 
aforesaid criteria.  
 RESTRICTIONS IN RELATION TO PROFESSIONAL CLIENTS 4.2.
Whereas one might well argue that applying differing investor protection measures only 
extends as far as intra-EU financial service providers are concerned, the fact that such 
restrictions towards per se professional clients are not needed is not affected. As indicated 
above, Annex II of MiFID II provides for a great deal of requirements and thresholds. As long 
as these prerequisites are abided by, the client is deemed to be a professional client, insofar as 
the per se professional client does not explicitly request to be treated as a retail client. Given 
the high standards in terms of capital minimums, experience and competence levels of natural 
persons occupying managerial positions, and their prior experience in financial services, the 
treatment of professional clients under MiFID II remains most puzzling.
151
 Unlike mere retail 
investors, professional clients are subject to strict capital adequacy standards and must adhere 
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to sufficient educational and professional requirements. Nonetheless, these heightened 
requirements, as per MiFID II, do not allow professional clients to deal with a much greater 
level of independence. Given that the EU regulatory framework vis-à-vis investor protection 
has mainly been focused on retail clients, there appears to be little to none legal basis for 
imposing upon third-country investment service providers equal restrictions as when dealing 
with retail investors. 
As has been pointed out by legal scholars, the other main differentiating characteristic playing 
in the favour of professional clients is the funds utilised. Whereas retail clients put their own 
assets at risk by purchasing financial services or products, professional entities by and large 
operate with funds received from other entities. Given that this capital has been acquired via 
the professional client's professional business activities,
152
 this group of service recipients 
does not need to be subject to equal protection mechanisms as those described under the 
previous section. Provided that the regulatory framework allows for sufficient systematic and 
prudential risk minimisation mechanisms, the process of fund acquisition by professional 
investors over the course of their professional dealings will have been governed by 
appropriate investor protection regimes. Consequently, forcing retail-market appropriate 
norms upon professional clients results in an unnecessary twofold application of investor 
protection norms. In this instance, the first time the regulatory regime applies is at the 
moment when, say, retail clients entrust their assets upon professional entities. The second 
application subsequently takes place when the professional client attempts to solicit third-
country firms' services in efforts to utilise funds at their disposal. 
Given that it has long been the approach of EU lawmakers to ensure a relative degree of 
liberty vis-à-vis professional clients and their dealings within financial markets,153 the current 
MiFID II marketing ban is questionable. Indeed, as outlined above, it results in the repeated 
application of very stringent restrictions to entities which generally do not need such 
protections. Moreover, MiFID II still provides per se professional entities the opportunity to 
be treated as mere retail clients, hence ensuring that a simple prima facie categorisation as a 
professional client does not bar inexperienced recipients from enjoying the needed level of 
safeguards. Seeing as burdensome regulations only supress service providers' appetite to enter 
the respective jurisdiction,
154
 a step-back from European legislators is in fact very much 
needed. 
Despite the EU’s previous approach towards professional clients, whereby lawmakers faced 
strong opposition against applying restrictions for professional clients resulting in similar 
treatment when compared to retail clients, MiFID II appears to break off from the EU’s prior 
approach.
155
 Whereas one might well differentiate between per se professional client, retail 
and professional-at-request clients, applying identical restrictions to all three groups under 
Article 42 MiFID II appears to lack any solid legal basis. 
Instead, Article 42 of MiFID II ought to appropriately take into account the differences 
between retail and professional clients, and expressly provide for marketing and solicitation 
bans only insofar as retail clients are concerned. Consequently, a revision of Article 42 should 
afford greater freedom when interacting with per se professional clients and professional-at-
request clients. In terms of marketing, the degree of third-country firms’ ability to market 
                                                 
152
 Moloney, supra note 120, p.25. 
153
 Ibid. 
154
 Ibid, p.26. 
155
 Ibid, pp.24-25. 
29 
 
their services may only be extended towards per se professional clients. Should it also be 
extended to professional-at-request clients, which originally are only retail clients, European 
investor protection concerns would once again be put at risk. Influenced by improper 
promotional activities well-suited for professional clients, retail clients would be likely to yet 
again underestimate the appropriateness of their investments,
156
 and substantially damage 
households’ savings. 
As outlined under the previous section dealing with retail clients, proportionality and 
suitability considerations must be taken into account when assessing a particular restriction. It 
thus must be noted that a measure fails to meet either criteria, if a less-restrictive approach 
could be provided for. Additionally, these concepts prohibit the twofold application of equal 
rules.
157
 Thus, seeing as professional clients utilise funds received from investors under a 
heavily, and appropriately, regulated regime, applying identical restrictions for yet another 
time evidently lacks any solid reasoning. 
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 REVERSE SOLICITATION VERSUS "PASSPORTING" 5.
Purely for sake of comparison, the thesis shall also take into account the notion of 
"passporting" of financial services. Although it is reserved merely for undertakings 
originating from within the borders of the Union, it shall nonetheless be of relevance in 
emphasising the stark restrictions provided under MiFID II. Moreover, as per settled case law 
and EU law itself, non-EU entities may be afforded a more favourable regime when compared 
to its competitors established within the Union.
158
 Consequently, reverse solicitation under 
Article 42 of MiFID II may not provide for a less-stringent market access regime than the 
most lenient concept reserved for only European undertakings, i.e., the concept of 
passporting. 
Passporting is one of the current-day cornerstone legal tools available to intra-EU financial 
services firms allowing them to operate throughout the Union without establishing any 
physical presence in other EU member states. Instead, passporting permits financial service 
providers to offer their products and services cross-border directly to their clients.
159
 The 
eventual introduction of the passporting regime was a much-needed bolster to one of the basic 
four freedoms, namely, the free flow of capital, as it abolished the need for European financial 
market participants from gaining recognition and subsequent authorisation from supervisory 
authorities in each EU member state separately, instead providing for a relatively 
straightforward method of notifying the local authorities.  
Passporting, however, heavily relies on the mutual recognition and support between the 
supervisory authorities of the home and recipient member states.
160
 Therefore, in absence of a 
sufficiently harmonised regulatory framework, the passporting concept would fail to establish 
continued supervision of cross-border activities. Where the home member state’s authorities 
might well regard the activities of a particular financial services entity fully compliant with 
the local laws, the supervisors in a different EU member state might not follow suit. Thus, 
passporting can only properly operate in environments wherein the regulatory systems are 
sufficiently harmonised. 
Considering the aforementioned, one is able to comprehend why passporting is not permitted 
in relation to third-country firms. Where EU legislative acts cease to apply, no harmonisation 
can be ensured, and thus the supervisory authorities carrying out supervision over activities 
crossing the borders of the Union are unable to ensure the activities comply with the 
respective laws.
161
 
These shortcomings can, however, be mitigated via the conclusion of memorandums of 
understanding between financial supervisors of European and foreign jurisdictions. However, 
should that ever be the case, such arrangements would unfortunately fall short of achieving an 
adequate level of harmonisation, therefore resulting in ineffective cross-border cooperation. 
To a certain degree, reverse solicitation might well be compared to passporting. For one, both 
regimes provide for the utilisation of existing company infrastructures without imposing 
further requirements for the setting-up of, say, physical establishment in the member state 
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wherein services are to be provided.
162
 Nonetheless, when examining the two concepts in 
greater detail, this appears to be the sole shared factor, as entities carrying a European 
passport need not abide by advertising restrictions. Furthermore, the scope of services they 
may render equals to those services it is licenced to perform in the home country,
163
 and it 
maintains the default applicability of EU law and recourse to courts located within the Union. 
Reverse solicitation, as outlined under previous paragraphs, is limited to the particular service 
requested by the client. Should the client only request one particular financial service, the 
third-country entity is not permitted to somehow entice the client to request further services, 
as that would be an evident breach of the prohibition to advertise or otherwise promote further 
engagement from the client. 
Notwithstanding, reverse solicitation and passporting can also be likened in terms of their 
longevity. Neither concept, at least for the time being, should the successor of MiFID II 
provide for a different treatment of third-country firms, is dependent on some member state 
authority’s approval. Instead, under both regimes member states are under the duty to 
recognise the undertakings’ reliance on the respective concept,164 provided the prerequisites 
have been abided by. 
Another point of difference is the initiation of services. Under the passporting regime, 
national authorities must first be notified of the entity's intent to begin operating on the basis 
of its European passport. Whereas this might appear to be relatively harmless in terms of 
potential bureaucratic burdens, the main point of concern for intra-EU entities is merely the 
ability for the national supervisor to reject its plea.
165
 Insofar as required by the respective 
third-country local laws, non-EU entities need not undergo such notification procedure. 
Additionally, as outlined above, the third-country firm must not first contact any European 
authority prior to rendering a service or product according to Article 42 of MiFID II.  
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 FUTURE OF REVERSE SOLICITATION 6.
It has been argued that reverse solicitation is by no means a strategy that could be adopted by 
non-EU service providers, as it instead provides for a third-country entities to stay put until 
the moment an EU-based client were to actively approach them. Moreover, the current digital 
age allows promotional materials to reach audiences not necessarily intended to be the target 
audience.
166
 Nonetheless, the author of this thesis foresees a future for reverse solicitation, 
provided that the necessary degree of change is brought about by whichever legal instrument 
supersedes it. The particulars of such adjustments will be dealt with under the following 
paragraphs. 
As extensively argued by legal scholars, reverse solicitation in its current form falls short of 
providing third-country entities a sufficient framework for the setting-up of a long-term 
access point to European clients.
167, 168, 169
 Nonetheless, whereas the concept's heavy reliance 
on a purely reactionary business model could potentially only support a very minimal number 
of transactions for non-EU financial service providers,
170
 larger entities which have secured 
strong brands in the respective financial markets would not necessarily suffer nearly as 
much.
171
 Consequently, reverse solicitation could be successfully incorporated into the 
business strategies of well-established entities which need not rely on heavy marketing 
activities to attain additional clients and secure deals. Hence, the relevance of the concept for 
non-EU entities must not be diminished, provided the aforesaid considerations in terms of the 
service providers' prominence is taken into account. 
With letters dated 20 November 2017 and 26 September 2018, ESMA publicly expressed its 
concerns over the current reverse solicitation regime. In highlighting the fact the under 
reverse solicitation, EU clients would fall outside the scope of protections afforded by Union 
law, thus potentially posing a high degree of unwarranted risk to investors, in particular retail 
clients.
172
 In attempting to resolve these issues, ESMA set forth a total of three potential 
solutions the implementation of which could mitigate the existing problems inherent to 
reverse solicitation, each of them addressed under the following subparagraphs. 
In addressing the evident shortcoming of the AIFMD and UCITS regimes, the European 
Commission (hereinafter: EC or Commission) has called for the introduction of Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on facilitating cross-border 
distribution of collective investment funds
173
 (hereinafter: Proposal), explaining that merely a 
legal instrument having direct legal effect can attain a sufficient level of harmonisation across 
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the pan-European region.
174
 On the basis of analysis conducted in reference to Article 42 of 
MiFID II, it is hereby submitted that in the future the reverse solicitation regime ought to be 
incorporated into an EU regulation, affording a preferable degree of legal certainty for third-
country financial service providers servicing European clients. 
While the application of identical marketing and solicitation regimes towards both retail and 
professional clients is questioned throughout the thesis, the work does not call for the 
exemption of certain product classes in a similar manner to that in terms of marketing. It has 
been suggested that drawing additional lines between products and services appropriate for 
retail clients, and those deemed to be of a far too risky nature is an exceptionally difficult task 
to properly undertake.
175
 Moreover, with the continued emergence of new and innovative 
financial services that may share very little, if anything, with products currently regulated 
under MiFID II, lawmakers would have a far too difficult task with ensuring the Directive’s 
relevance over time. Consequently, the work calls for differentiation in terms of promotion 
towards retail and professional clients, leaving the product differentiation rules unaffected. 
Given that one of the core aims of MiFID II was the improvement of financial markets' 
efficiency,
176
 a further revision of the Directive in terms of professional clients would merely 
supplement EU legislators' attempts in achieving this aforesaid goal. Moreover, the efficiency 
goal also calls for harmonisation in relation to non-EU service providers accessing European 
markets and clients. 
 MARKETING REGIME 6.1.
Similarly to calls for the Proposal revising the EU regulatory framework in terms of AIFMD 
and UCITS funds’ marketing restrictions,177 identical EU-wide rules in terms of marketing 
activities under MiFID II are needed. The aforementioned EC Proposal underlines the need 
for increased transparency within the realm of promotion of funds,
178
 which in turn is bound 
to improve the investor protection environment. This is especially pertinent when addressing 
retail clients, as they might not necessarily be able to notice misguiding advice. 
Whereas the categorisation of retail and professional clients is not of significance for the 
purposes of reverse solicitation when assessed pursuant to the current MiFID II regime, as 
third-country firms may rely on reverse solicitation if either client category solicits the 
respective services, it still provides crucial considerations in relation to proposed revisions of 
Article 42 of MiFID II. As argued previously, there is little to no legal basis for subjecting 
professional clients to restrictions identical to those relevant for retail clients. Moreover, it has 
been submitted that the current rules are disproportionate and have no justifiable legitimate 
aim. Therefore, a revised reverse solicitation regime under MiFID II should differentiate 
between the treatment of retail and professional clients.  
The Proposal would provide for marketing materials to be clearly construed and perceived by 
the target audience as marketing information. Moreover, entities distributing units in funds 
would be obliged to expressly provide for risks associated with the particular financial 
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product, not only promote the potential returns.
179
 Moreover, marketing material would have 
to contain information pertaining to additional financial documents and statements allowing 
would-be investors to examine the suitability of their intended investment.
180
 
More crucially, the Proposal would provide for an explicit definition of activities amounting 
to pre-marketing. The scope of the pre-marketing regime would, however, be rather limited, 
as it would only refer to marketing activities covering funds that have not yet been 
established,
181
 with references to existing funds and entities exempted from the scope of 
permitted pre-marketing activities. Additionally, AIFMs would be barred from undertaking 
pre-marketing activities in relation to retail clients, with the Proposal permitting it only in 
relation to professional investors.
182
 In essence, pre-marketing activities would merely permit 
managers to "test the waters" and assess potential investors’ interest in committing to a 
potential fund. 
Consequently, all and any marketing activities could only contain general information 
pertaining to "strategies or investment ideas"
183
. Given that the concept of pre-marketing 
would not be extended to already incorporated and registered or licenced funds, would-be 
investors could not be presented with the opportunity of already committing their funds to the 
upcoming fund. Similarly, concrete prospectuses and other documentation required for the 
establishment of funds would exceed the scope of pre-marketing, as merely drafts without the 
possibility of subscription thereto would be permitted.
184
 These restrictions severely limit the 
potential benefits of pre-marketing activities, as fund managers would be allowing to 
disseminate overall general ideas without disclosing specifics. Nonetheless, these 
recommendations would increase legal certainty by providing for an explicit definition of pre-
marketing, therefore partially eliminating yet another possibility to rely on regulatory 
arbitrage. The scope of changes to be brought about by any such amendments will still be 
reliant on the whether AIFMD is succeeded by a directive or a regulation, with the former 
calling for national transposition. As discussed before, such second step at the level of 
national member states' legislatures has proven to bring about further exemptions or 
restrictions not necessarily called for the by base document itself. 
Much to the detriment of non-EU entities, however, pre-marketing activities would be 
permitted only in relation to European AIFMs. Despite the possibility to yet again utilise 
regulatory arbitrage and rely on gaps in the revised regime, it should be noted that European 
member states have been expressly barred from adopting a more lenient approach when 
regulating third-country entities, compared to restrictions imposed upon intra-EU AIFMs.
185
 
Notwithstanding, the proposed definition of "pre-marketing" would differ significantly from 
the current understanding of the regime, as it would no longer refer to activities not 
amounting to "marketing" in the strictest sense. Instead, by providing a definition of the 
notion in terms of a proposed AIF yet to be established, the concept would be heavily altered. 
Whereas the proposed changes have been met with widespread praise,
186
 it would no longer 
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be of much use in the interpretation of the regime under MiFID II in light of the resulting 
wording. 
 REQUIREMENT TO DEMONSTRATE CLIENTS' OWN EXCLUSIVE INITIATIVE 6.2.
ESMA, in its aforementioned communique, sets out as the first proposal the requirement to 
have non-EU financial service providers demonstrate to national regulatory authorities the 
own exclusive initiative of the respective client, should the firm receive such request from 
national authorities.
187
 As analysed in greater detail under section No. 3.1, third-country 
service providers ought to maintain proper internal records substantiating the fact of the 
particular client’s exclusive initiative in approaching the firm to solicit financial services and 
products, as failure to do so may well result in the national supervisory authorities presuming 
one of the core prerequisites under Article 42 MiFID II has not been met. 
At the same time, not all national regulators will accept simple affirmations from clients as 
sufficient basis to ascertain that the respective client did approach the firm on their own 
initiative. Consequently, the exact procedure for demonstrating the client's own initiative must 
be set forth by EU law. One may well choose to pursue the current approach of the UK's 
authority, which permits the use of confirmations received from clients. Absent any other 
concrete approach that could, on the one hand, truly work in practice, and, on the other hand, 
not cause too big of a headache to third-country firms in terms of widespread record-keeping 
requirements, this tested and tried method could serve as a solid basis for redefining Europe's 
approach towards reverse solicitation. 
MiFID II has thus placed third-country firms in a peculiar position. On the one hand, access to 
EU-based clients appears to be as effortless as never before. On the other hand, however, the 
possibility to demonstrate the exclusive initiate of the client in approaching the firm seems to 
be a mere afterthought. While this requirement must be complied with to rely on Article 42 of 
MiFID II, at the same time it remains unclear as to how to document this. Requiring 
confirmations from recipients of such services would provide for some much-needed relief to 
third-country firms. However, this could well lead to dishonest disclosures provided by retail 
clients under the persistent pressure of the respective non-EU entities. 
This dilemma could be solved via the imposition of a dual client-firm confirmation, whereby 
both parties separately would vouch for the transaction’s compliance with the limitations as 
set forth by Article 42 of MiFID II.  
 RECOURSE TO EU COURTS 6.3.
Given the considerations of marketing activities under Article 42, MiFID II appears to draw 
two separate abstract borders. Namely, the activity solicited by the client on the basis of 
reverse solicitation is seen as having been performed outside the territory of the Union, 
whereas the relationship between the client and the firm nonetheless somehow remains within 
the EU, at least in relation to marketing activities and solicitation. MiFID II creates an 
artificial enclave within the Union wherein EU law, at least to a partial degree, has no 
jurisdiction. This aspect appears to be a major oversight of European legislators, who 
apparently intended, on the one hand, to exclude the application of EU investor protection 
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measures to services provided under reverse solicitation, and, on the other hand, still wished 
to eliminate marketing activities by third-country entities without branches located in the 
Union. 
As put forth by ESMA, another possible solution would be to remove any reference to the 
automatic exclusion of intra-EU courts. As discussed above, nothing under MiFID II prohibits 
parties to a particular contract to agree upon the jurisdiction of European courts in settling 
disputes, should any arise. Nonetheless, given Recital 111 of MiFID II, which stipulates that 
when operating pursuant to Article 42, "the services should not be deemed as provided in the 
territory of the Union"
188
, Brussels I bis does not lead to a prima facie recourse to EU courts. 
Whereas jurisdictional questions are exclusively dealt with by Brussels I bis, a potential 
change in jurisdiction could also alter the applicable law, hence the following shall also 
provide for a brief reference to an interpretation of Rome I. 
Presuming that one can ensure compliance with the above prerequisites, both MiFID II and 
Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on markets in financial instruments
189
 (hereinafter: MiFIR) stipulate that such services will 
not be deemed to have been provided within the territory of the EU,
190, 191
 which in turn 
excludes the automatic applicability of EU laws and access to European courts. Consequently, 
this approach raises further issues pertaining to both legal certainty and investor protection. 
Moreover, the dispute resolution mechanism applicable to transactions based on reverse 
solicitation becomes rather complicated when compared to services rendered by firms 
established within the Union. Therefore the next subparagraphs shall be dedicated to a 
comprehensive assessment of the two current EU regulations governing the applicable law 
and jurisdiction issues in relation to disputes of "civil or commercial nature"
192
. 
It must be noted that provisions under neither MiFID II, nor MiFIR prevail over the parties' 
ability to exercise their rights stemming from Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations
193
 (hereinafter: Rome I) and Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
194
 (hereinafter: Brussels I bis). 
Among the other suggestions as to possible revisions of MiFID II, ESMA put forth the prima 
facie jurisdiction of intra-EU courts in case of disputes arising out of services provided 
pursuant to Article 42 of MiFID II. The necessity of this, however, remains questionable. In 
this regard, the application of Rome I and Brussels I bis as regards financial services contracts 
between third-country firms and EU service recipients shall also be taken into account. 
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6.3.1. Jurisdiction, and applicable law 
Should the necessary amendments be made, pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) of Brussels I bis even 
in absence of any express contractual agreement between the parties would courts of the 
respective member state wherein the service was provided have jurisdiction to adjudge the 
particular dispute.
195
 However, the effectiveness of this is questionable. First and foremost, 
the parties would still be at liberty to opt for some other jurisdiction via the mere insertion of 
a short yet decisive dispute resolution clause. Second, such alterations to MiFID II would 
result in undertakings wholly foreign to European law suddenly facing litigation before intra-
EU courts. Hence, third-country firms would face yet another powerful deterrent to entry into 
the European market. At the same time, however, the issue could be seen from the viewpoint 
of retail investors, to whom litigation of any sort, let alone before courts of third-countries 
would be more than problematic. 
Consequently, the presumed recourse to European courts could, in fact, be welcomed, but it is 
certainly not of essence. Where retail clients could unintentionally benefit from the rule 
should any issues arise in the provision of the particular service or product, more-experienced 
clients could easily avoid having to litigate before intra-EU courts by incorporating a specific 
dispute resolution clause favouring the use of a non-EU court. Thus, parties which are well 
aware of this mechanism and thus believe to be able to benefit from such additional 
agreement would not be prohibited from doing whatever they deem to be best for the 
particular transaction, whereas retail clients would continue to enjoy the protection of 
European courts.  
Following an interpretation of Article 1 of Rome I, disputes arising out of or in relation to 
services rendered by third-country undertakings to individuals in the EU, be it professional or 
retail clients, would still fall under the scope of the Regulation.
196
 Furthermore, Rome I does 
not prohibit the application of the law of non-EU countries under Article 2, should its conflict 
of laws provisions lead to the applicability of the law of a third country.
197
 
Absent any choice-of-law provision under the particular contract, Article 4(1)(b) stipulates 
that contracts for the provision of financial services on the basis of reverse solicitation will be 
governed by the law of the country of incorporation of the service provider.
198
 Nonetheless, as 
a general rule under Article 3 Rome I, parties to a contract may well choose a law at their own 
discretion,
199
 therefore providing the opportunity to avoid the application of complex foreign 
laws. Given that the service will be seen as having been provided outside the territory of the 
EU, it may well be wise to integrate the respective foreign jurisdiction's law as applicable 
under the respective provision of services or product agreement. Should that not be the case, 
the litigation process, whereby a judge of the respective third-country court would have to 
apply a wholly foreign set of rules could well complicate any dispute resolution attempts. 
However, the recipient classification regime is also of essence in applying the relevant rules 
stemming from both Rome I and Brussels I bis. Whereas professional clients under MiFID II 
must adhere to specific criteria, both of these Regulations instead take into account whether 
the transaction was carried out within the scope of the client's professional dealings.
200
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Without necessarily taking into account the client's background in terms of their profession 
and education,
201
 a natural person categorised under MiFID II as a professional entity might 
still enjoy protections stemming from either Regulation. Such separation of the client's 
competencies and the transaction itself could well have unintended consequences for non-EU 
entities entering into contracts with EU clients under the presumption that clients adhering to 
the professional client category under MiFID II need not be afforded "economically 
weaker"
202
 party protections stemming from Rome I and Brussels I bis. Moreover, it has been 
submitted that neither the frequency of transactions, nor the scope of investments in terms of 
the size of assets involved are to have any influence in ascertaining the applicable provisions 
in terms of jurisdiction and applicable law issues.
203
 
Considering the above comments in relation to a proposed jurisdiction change, and 
accounting for the conflict-of-laws provisions of Rome I, it is hereby submitted that such 
changes would need to be broader in scope to allow for an efficient dispute resolution process. 
Should the service provided be presumed to have taken place within the borders of the EU, 
while the parties would subsequently apply the law of the country of registration of the third-
country entity, litigations would become rather complicated. Having presumably European-
educated judges serve on panels whereby the law of a completely foreign jurisdiction is to be 
applied could very likely lead to unnecessarily lengthy court proceedings due to the involved 
parties' inexperience in dealing with the respective law. 
 REVISION OF ARTICLE 42 MIFID II 6.4.
It can well be argued that ensuring non-EU firms’ access to the internal market of the EU will 
only benefit the business environment, giving clients a broader choice of service providers, 
fostering their ability to tailor their investment choices according to each client’s respective 
needs. Considering that limitations imposed upon competition between intra-EU entities are 
undoubtedly harmful, the same argument can be extended to include cross-border competition 
with undertakings incorporated in foreign jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, an interconnected system which allows foreign entities to access the EU market 
could well lead to a more stable internal market better suited to weather internal crises that do 
not affect foreign jurisdictions.
204
 Nonetheless, a counterargument may well be launched 
against the second notion, as opening the EU market to foreign entities will ensure that 
instabilities in the respective foreign markets will inevitably echo within the EU. However, 
this double-edged sword appears to be much less harmful when taking into account well-
established competition law notions, which generally regards restrictions upon competition as 
detrimental to the market. 
Therefore, it is hereby submitted that albeit a revision of Article 42 is of essence, any such 
changes must not lead to third-country entities being barred from access to the EU. Instead, a 
future Article 42 of MiFID II should first and foremost refrain from imposing limitations in 
relation to professional clients. 
When drafting the successor of MiFID II, European lawmakers must take into account a 
number of problematic areas of relevance for reverse solicitation. First and foremost, the most 
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crucial terms must be clearly defined under the Directive. These would include the notions of 
"marketing", "general public", "large group of clients or potential clients"
205
, and "large 
category of clients or potential clients"
206
. Failure to provide harmonised interpretation of the 
above terms has led to the very existence of this thesis, as the uncertainty behind reverse 
solicitation was the main basis for conducting research on this topic in the first place. 
Given the very nature of directives, however, efforts to provide for a harmonised environment 
for third-country firms might not go as far as necessary even when providing for the above 
shortcomings. As highlighted by national transpositions of the AIFMD, and considering other 
arguments raised throughout the work, the current reliance on national transpositions has 
resulted in a mix of jurisdictions interpreting reverse solicitation in an inconsistent manner.
207
 
In its current iteration, MiFID II explicitly provides that third-country entities are to rely on 
national regulatory regimes,
208
 which might not provide for a sufficiently harmonised regime 
vis-à-vis non-EU service providers. Whereas Recital 107 of MiFID I is clearly intended to be 
applied only in relation to intra-EU firms, it is hereby submitted that it must be extended to a 
degree which would permit third-country entities to have "the same opportunities of joining or 
having access to regulated markets throughout the Union"
209
, at least as far as professional 
clients are receiving services.  
Subsequently, taking into account the legal status of MiFID II and the above considerations, it 
is hereby submitted that reverse solicitation must be incorporated under a regulation, as 
regulations do not require national transpositions. Consequently, the European financial 
services market would provide for a harmonised regulation of relevance for non-EU entities 
operating on the basis of reverse solicitation regardless of the particular EU member state 
wherein the service is provided, or wherein the firm's marketing activities are executed.  
6.4.1. Reverse solicitation versus equivalence regime 
Should the aforementioned changes be adopted, resulting in third-country firms gaining 
access to European professional clients on the basis of reverse solicitation without marketing 
and investor protection concerns, the reverse solicitation regime would largely mirror that of 
the concept of equivalence.
210
 While such duplication is unnecessary, the following 
paragraphs shall argue that the two regimes are not necessarily equal and thus the changes to 
Article 42 of MiFID II are still very much needed, as it will be submitted that equivalence 
cannot substitute reverse solicitation. 
Under the equivalence regime as provided for by Article 46 of MiFIR, third-country firms 
may also service "eligible counterparties and … professional clients"211 on a cross-border 
basis within the EU following the adoption of an equivalence decision by the EC and the 
firm's subsequent registration into a register maintained by ESMA.
212, 213
 The equivalence 
decision, should it be supported by the Commission, first, affirms the conformity of the third-
country's financial regulatory environment with that of the EU, and, second, acknowledges 
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the quality of the regulatory environment of that third-country,
214, 215
 essentially deeming the 
two jurisdictions compatible and providing for sufficient investor protection mechanisms. 
The very first limitation under the equivalence regime is its exclusion of retail clients, since 
entities which are deemed to already be governed under sufficiently rigorous third-country 
laws would still not gain access to European retail clients.
216, 217
 Having provided little to no 
guidance as to the exact criteria to be applied in assessing the compatibility between the laws 
of the EU and those of the third-country,
218
 the possibility to obtain a favourable equivalence 
decision might well guarantee non-EU entities the same mediocre level of legal certainty. 
Moreover, the temporal effect of such equivalence decision remains highly concerning. 
Following the three-year transitional period of the decision adopted by the EC, third-country 
firms may no longer rely on the decision and will once again find themselves barred from 
interacting even with eligible counterparties and professional clients.
219
 Furthermore, the EC 
equivalence decision may well be revoked at any time,
220
 should the Commission deem that 
the two jurisdictions are no longer sufficiently harmonised or similar.
221
 MiFIR does not 
provide for any sort of prior notification towards the third-country firms operating under the 
equivalence regime, therefore rendering the reliance on Article 46 of MiFIR particularly 
precarious. 
In reference to the above remarks alleging the supposed likeness of reverse solicitation and 
the equivalence regime, it must be noted that the scopes of the two concepts are significantly 
different. For one, reverse solicitation covers both retail and professional clients, whereas 
non-EU entities may not interact with European retail service recipients even under the 
Article 46 of MiFIR. Furthermore, MiFIR does not provide for anything akin to Recital 85 of 
MiFID II, namely, the separation between marketing activities of general nature, and those 
aimed at specifically influencing the client to initiate a transaction. Thus, marketing 
restrictions under MiFIR appear to be even more restricted than those under MiFID II, a 
peculiarity that appears to be even more confusing when considering that reverse solicitation 
is open also for retail clients. Given the extensive retail investor protection concerns as 
outlined above, restrictions towards eligible counterparties and professional clients under 
MiFIR being stricter than those applicable in relation to retail clients under MiFID II make 
little to no sense. 
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 CONCLUSION 7.
Having addressed the most pertinent components that form the very concept of Article 42 of 
MiFID II, the research question as set forth in the introduction of this work may finally be 
addressed. Thus, on the basis of the preceding analysis it is hereby submitted that the scope of 
Article 42 MiFID II, on the one hand, is too restrictive while its wording, on the other hand, is 
too ambiguous, resulting in a high risk of unintentional breach of its scope by third-country 
financial service providers. 
On the basis of analysis performed throughout this thesis, the relatively succinct Article 42 
contains a worryingly large number of completely un- or merely ill-defined concepts, 
especially in terms of "marketing", and "own exclusive initiative". In absence of any concrete 
and sufficiently broad clarifications by European authorities, third-country service providers 
would yet again fall victim of a patchwork of national regulatory regimes with wildly 
different views as to what one and the same concept as incorporated under MiFID II truly 
means.  
At the same time, third-country undertakings under the current MiFID II regime are 
tremendously restricted when intending to establish relationships with European clients. Since 
marketing activities could likely be banned in terms of either client category, and given that 
an explicit reference as to the temporal application of the marketing ban is absent from MiFID 
II, non-EU entities must either proceed with a very minor degree of legal certainty, or 
terminate plans to conduct business with European clients altogether. Additionally, one must 
yet again refer to Recital 85 of MiFID II. Despite the extensive analysis undertaken 
throughout this thesis, it is still not necessarily clear as to what is the exact scope of permitted 
third-country firms' marketing activities.  
Thus, the most severe shortcomings in terms of reverse solicitation are exemplified by the 
client categorisation and subsequent investor protection regime under MiFID II. Not only are 
professional clients treated with the same degree of effort as retail clients, restrictions 
provided by the Directive do not differentiate between the two very distinct groups. 
Marketing is banned in relation to both retail and professional clients equally, notwithstanding 
the severe thresholds European clients need to meet in order to conform to the professional 
client category. Hence, even though the professional client categorisation mechanism has 
been specifically designed as to only incorporate service recipients with suitable capital 
cushions, and tremendous professional experience, just to name a few, per se professional 
clients are still looked after much like retail clients. 
While this degree of care extended to entities that might not necessarily need or even wish to 
be subject to the same restrictions, their limited access to services must be appropriately 
underscored. As indicated above, professional clients most often are legal persons that do not 
act on a whim, and limit themselves to investment activities as provided for by their internal 
guidelines and policies. Thus, it seems contrary to the current MiFID II client categorisation 
regime to put aside professional clients' competences and instead limit access to sought-after 
products and services. Whilst a successful line of argumentation could well celebrate the 
supposed achievements in terms of retail client protection within the EU, as non-European 
entities could be seen as completely barred from promoting their services towards European 
clients, one must not neglect the lost opportunities for professional clients.  
Moreover, as indicated under section No. 4 covering client protection regimes, measures must 
be proportionate and not extend beyond what is needed. These core concepts appear to be 
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breached when reviewing restrictions applicable in terms of professional clients, and thus a 
revision of Article 42 of MiFID II is, indeed, needed, albeit the proposed changes might not 
necessarily fully align with those called for by ESMA. 
By setting up a more liberal playing field in terms of access to per se professional clients, 
third-country entities and service recipients alike would benefit from freedoms in terms of 
marketing. For one, non-EU entities would no longer have to fret about marketing activities 
from decades ago, which at the moment appear to be capable of preventing the use of reverse 
solicitation. Moreover, by explicitly permitting broader marketing activities as outlined under 
Recital 85 of MiFID II to non-EU entities, professional clients could well become acquainted 
with innovative services and products capable of generating lucrative returns.  
Whilst MiFID II in its current wording could be interpreted as already granting third-country 
entities sufficient marketing freedoms insofar as reverse solicitation is concerned, this 
apparent uncertainty in and of itself signifies one of the core weaknesses of the Directive. 
Without an explicit confirmation as to the applicability of Recital 85 in the activities of third-
country firms, and given its extremely inconsistent use of wording when compared to MiFID 
II overall, non-EU entities simply do not enjoy a sufficient degree of legal certainty when 
dealing with European clients. 
The described risks in relation to permitted marketing regimes, and inadvertent licencing and 
registration breaches thus form a powerful deterrent to third-country financial service 
providers from ever engaging with EU-based clients. Consequently, the research question as 
set out in the introduction of this work is thus reaffirmed, subsequently allowing one to put 
forth a number of suggestions as to the future of the reverse solicitation regime, provided it 
will not face an immediate demise given its current state. 
The author of this thesis has time and time again called for certain de-regulation in terms of 
Article 42 of MiFID II. Nonetheless, on the basis of European investor protection measures, 
such liberalisation efforts certainly must not be allowed to go too far. Consequently, Article 
42 of MiFID II must be liberalised only insofar as per se professional entities are concerned. 
Should the same degree of loosening up be extended to the most vulnerable service and 
product recipient bodies, yet another crisis within the European financial markets would 
surely soon follow. The aforesaid is based on the most innate characteristics of retail clients, 
as they are and will forever remain particularly susceptible to misleading marketing practices, 
opportunistic service providers, and unintended exposures to large risks. Hence, changes in 
the marketing regime should only be extended as far as per se professional clients are 
concerned. 
However, sufficient levels of pan-European harmonisation cannot be achieved in the absence 
of an EU regulation. While this might just prove to be a too drastic of a change, a directly-
applicable regulation would eliminate most, if not all, concern areas for third-country 
undertakings. Instead of having to look out for jurisdictions which either "gold-plate" the 
respective national measures transposing EU law, or fail to incorporate certain concepts 
overall, the incorporation of the reverse solicitation regime in a regulation would achieve a 
level of harmonisation not yet seen in terms of the Article 42 notion. However, in drafting of 
such regulation, the current shortcoming of MiFID II must be taken into account. Should it 
ever see the light of the day, such regulation must incorporate concrete definitions of 
marketing, since the failure of MiFID II to provide for a well-rounded definition of 
"marketing" is evidently one of the most pressing issues in attempting to analyse the reverse 
solicitation regime. The current Directive's excessive and continued reliance on vague phrases 
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such as "own exclusive initiative", along with "new categories", "marketing", and "pre-
marketing", not to mention concepts stemming from Recital 85, have contributed to the sea of 
differing interpretations and the overall quality of uncertainty. 
As proven by the very wording of MiFID II and the respective scholarly debate, there is very 
little consensus as to what exactly the Directive permits to non-EU entities when it comes to 
its marketing regime. In altering the marketing regime, one must also finally provide for 
concrete definitions, at least as far as the very cornerstone notions of Article 42 are concerned. 
Thus, the concept of "marketing" ought to be clearly outlined under a revised MiFID II. 
However, as underlined previously, the replacement of MiFID II must ensure continued 
relevance over the years despite technological and other advances. Thus, marketing ought to 
be defined by emphasising the end goal sought, and effect of such activities, as opposed to 
merely focusing on the various methods and channels through which the concept of 
"marketing activities" could be shaped. 
Regard must still be had to case law of the CJEU. Time and time again has the court explicitly 
pointed out that restrictions in relation to third-country service providers are merely side 
effects, and non-EU entities may not invoke TFEU provisions pertaining to the freedom of 
capital movement in attempting to justify barrier-free access to European markets.
222
 This 
does not, however, prohibit reliance on, say, the MiFID II regime in accessing EU financial 
markets, and secondary law instruments are needed in ensuring a level playing field. In this 
regard, the possibility to introduce the reverse solicitation regime under a regulation must be 
underlined, as national transpositions cannot ensure the necessary uniform approach towards 
specific regimes requiring homogenous interpretation throughout the Union.  
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